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European Union and South Africa trade agreement have continuously grown since the post-
apartheid era. There seems to be enormous literature on these agreements as well as on how it 
has improved SA’s international trade. However, little attention has paid on how these trade 
agreements affects SA’s economy, its people as well as the integration of SADC. Using the 
realism and the world systems theory as theoretical frameworks, the study investigates the 
impact of SA-EU trade agreement as well as its implication for SADC. The study uses both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. The choice of method is influenced by the 
research questions raised. The data sources used for the research involved organizational 
records from the Southern African Customs Union, the World Bank, Southern African 
Development Community, South African Department of Trade and Industry, European Union, 
and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, among others. The qualitative 
data collected for the study was analysed using thematic content analysis where by the data 
were categorized into themes. While the quantitative data collected was analysed using 
statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) to produce tabularized descriptive statistics, 
tendencies, distribution plots, and charts so as to enable the researcher analyses the trend of the 
research questions as identified. 
 While TDCA expands trade between the trading partners, data collected also paint a sobering 
picture for the South African economy as the EU is overwhelmingly dominating trade between 
the two parties. This dissertation argues that the TDCA reinforces and reproduces the core-
periphery trade patterns between South Africa and the European union. SA-EU agreement 
accentuates core – periphery relation between South Africa and its SADC and SACU partners. 
This study also paints the glaring picture of interest and power play as motives for EU-South 
Africa relationship. This study argued that the British vote to exit the EU was motivated by 
power and self-interest. If actualized, the British exit from EU will have both negative and 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The 1994 transition into a democratic state allowed South Africa (SA) to negotiate trade 
agreements with other states. Subsequently, the South African government made an application 
for in the Lome Convention, which the European Union (EU) denied. However, the EU still 
found SA as an important and easier market to access. Thus, in 1996 the EU started engaging 
SA in trade discussions for the main purpose of creating a new trade and development 
collaboration. On paper, the main aim of these discussions was to increase and improve the 
trade conditions between the EU and South Africa (Assarson 2005: 7).  
In 1997, South Africa presented a position paper outlining the framework for creation of an 
EU-SA trade and development agreement between both parties. There was a consensus to the 
fact that SA would have more access to the EU market at a quicker and more extensive pace 
than the EU would have on SA market. There was also an agreement that products from 
agriculture be included in negotiations after initially wanting to exclude over 40 percent of SA 
agricultural products from any free trade agreement (Lee 2010: 87). After years of negotiations, 
the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) was officially signed in October 1999. 
However, it became operational on 1 January, 2000. 
The TDCA consisted of two parts; the actual free trade agreement between the EU and SA and 
the European Program for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) which consists of the 
EU’s financial support to SA in terms of social services, private sector development, good 
governance, democratisation and human rights and regional integration (Assarson 2005: 8). 
The agreement was constructed in such a manner that to implement fully, SA had a 12 years’ 
duration period while the EU had ten (Gibb 2003). 
South Africa has always been a dominant player within the Southern African region. Thus, the 
signing of TDCA was likely to impact the whole region as a whole. The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), which was formerly called the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was a regional organisation established as 
a result of the advantageous experiences of closer cooperation among the people and 
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governments within the Southern Africa region (Lewis 2001: 58).  Their main purpose was to 
promote economic liberalisation and integration within the region so as to develop economies.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Most studies focus on the South Africa - EU trade agreement, and how it has improved SA’s 
international trade. However, little effort has been made to point out how this trade agreement 
affects SA’s economy and whether or not it has a positive or negative impact on SA economy 
and people. Also, there is insufficient research on the impact of TDCA on SADC. Thus, this 
research will also look at whether the EU-SA trade agreement promote or retard integration 
within SADC region. Therefore, the research problem that this study is grappling with is the 
critical analysis of the trade agreement between SA and EU and the implications this agreement 
on SADC. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The overall aim is to critically analyse the SA and EU trade agreement between and look at the 
implications it has on SADC as a region. 
The specific objectives of this study are to: 
 To explore and understand economic partnership agreements and regional trade 
agreements. 
 To explore the impact of SA and EU trade agreement on the structure of South Africa 
trade welfare and economy. 
 To outline the implications this agreement has had on SADC and its role in promoting 
regional integration. 
 To assess the impact Britain’s exit from the EU will have on South Africa. 
1.4 Research Questions 
 What are economic partnership agreements and regional trade agreements? 
 What is the impact of the SA and EU trade agreement on the structure of South Africa 
trade welfare and economy? 
 How does the EU-South Africa trade agreement affect the promotion of regional 
integration within SADC? 
 What impact will the exit of Britain from the EU have on South Africa? 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
1.5.1 Research Design 
Most research in the field of social sciences use the qualitative and quantitative research 
designs. The choice of method is influenced by the research questions raised (Creswell, 2011; 
2013; Ritchie et al, 2013). This study used a mixed method of both qualitative and quantitative 
research design (Creswell, 2011; 2013). The qualitative research method is an explorative 
research which attempts to answer research problems from the perspective of the study 
population involved. The method is used to understand underlying opinions, motivations and 
rationales behind a particular social phenomenon (Green and Thorogood, 2013; Ritchie et al, 
2013; Smith, 2015; Taylor, et al, 2015).  The qualitative method includes participant 
observation, in depth interviews as well as focus group discussion (Welman et al 2005; Smith, 
2015; Taylor, et al, 2015). The quantitative method on the other hand is a research design which 
uses mathematical based methods in the collection and analysis of numerical data. It 
emphasises objectivity in measurements as well as the statistical and numerical analysis of data 
collected. It therefore, provides an in depth analysis by providing statistical information that 
the researcher is able to explain from a qualitative point of view (Creswell, 2013; Ritchie et al, 
2013; Bryman, 2015). 
The Mixed method research design is therefore a method of research which enables the 
collection and analysis of numerical and descriptive data (Creswell, 2013; Ritchie et al, 2013). 
The mixed method used for this study allowed for the integration of the gains of qualitative 
and quantitative methods so as to ensure that these two research methods complement each 
other in addressing the research questions for this study. By using qualitative research, the 
researcher gained a deep understanding of the trade agreement between EU and SA and its 
implications for SADC region. The quantitative method used also allowed for a statistical 
analysis which help validate the data from the qualitative method used for the study. 
The main aim of this research is to critically analyse the free trade agreement between EU and 
SA and its implication on SADC in promoting regional integration. The data sources used for 
the research also involved organisational records from the Southern African Customs Union, 
the World Bank, Southern African Development Community, South African Department of 
Trade and Industry, European Union, and Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation, among others. Secondary sources such as journals, monographs and newspapers 
were also used. 
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1.5.2 Data Analysis 
The qualitative data collected for the study was analysed using thematic content analysis where 
by the data were categorised into themes. The analysis allowed for the making of inferences 
whereby specific characters were systematically and objectively identified within the text 
(Stone, Dunphy, Smith and Ogilvie 1966: 5). The quantitative data was analysed using the 
statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS).  SPSS was used to produce tabularised 
descriptive statistics, tendencies, distribution plots, and charts so as to enable the researcher 
analyse the trend of the research questions as identified. 
 1.6 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1: This was the introductory chapter of the research. The chapter discussed the 
research background, problem, and research questions as well as the research objectives. The 
chapter went on to discuss the methodology for the research, the research limitation as well as 
the research chapter outline. 
Chapter 2: This chapter involves an analysis of existing literature related to the variables of 
the research. The chapter also critically examined the theories which served as the theoretical 
framework for the study. 
Chapter 3: This chapter analyses the implication of TDCA deal on the South African 
economy. It further discusses how the TDCA has influenced South Africa’s economic relations 
with its fellow SACU partners who were also directly affected by the TDCA deal. 
Chapter 4: This chapter analyses the impact and implications of the TDCA on the progress of 
regional economic integration in the SADC region in terms of economic and trade 
development. It analyses the factors and forces informing South Africa’s policy and approach 
to regional integration since 1994. This chapter also take stock of the role and extent of South 
Africa’s influence and actions in the intra-regional trade in the SADC region in terms of its 
exports and imports.  
Chapter 5: This chapter discuss Britain exit from the European Union and its likely impact on 
South Africa. It provided a brief background of why Britain moved out of the EU, the role that 
Britain had in the EU and the trade relations that exists between SA and the Britain. At the core 
of this chapter was an attempt to understand the possible implications of such a move to the 
South African economy. 
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Chapter 6: This chapter is the concluding chapter of the research. It presented the summary 
of the research and research findings, implication of the research, recommendation of the 


































Literature Review and Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks 
2.0  Introduction 
The relationship between trade and development is well-recognized and well-documented. 
Under that context, the trade patterns and balance between the developed and developing 
countries have attracted extensive academic scrutiny (Wallerstein, 1974; Carbaugh, 2002; 
Assarson, 2006). Although the literature on TDCA between the EU and South Africa has grown 
considerably, the impact it has within the SADC region and Africa in general has been largely 
been under-researched. However, documenting and analysing the impact of the TDCA on 
SADC and Africa can possibly contribute towards improving the terms of agreement. 
Moreover, such an approach may generate new insights on why such agreements may be 
problematic in their effects and implementation. 
This chapter surveys existing scholarship on the relevance of the trade deal signed between 
European Union and South Africa in the context of trade and economic development nexus in 
general. This chapter will begin with a general discussion of the trade-economic development 
nexus; this will be followed by the discussion of trade theories.  The discussion of trade theories 
will be followed by the discussion of trade barriers in apartheid South Africa. The chapter will 
then discuss the Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement and trade policy tools. 
Finally, this chapter will discuss the theories and concepts of regional integration as theoretical 
framework for the study’s analysis.  
2.1  Trade-Economic Development Nexus: An Appraisal 
This section will survey and synthesize existing scholarship on the relationship (or lack thereof) 
between international trade and economic development. This will enable a much more 
informed and balanced analysis of the possible repercussions of the TDCA on South Africa 
and its immediate neighbours’ economic performance. Needless to say, the foremost aim of 
the trade deal was to boost the involved parties’ economic standing in the first place. Since no 
country produces everything it needs, trade has always been an essential economic and life-
supporting activity for individuals, households, communities and countries alike. Standard 
economic theory has it that the volume of trade especially international as source of foreign 
exchange earnings or generation and economic development are closely correlated. This line 
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of argument was advanced by classical economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo as well 
as Hecksher and Ohlin. Although their arguments were different and varied, they essentially 
agreed that trade liberalization, if carefully managed, was closely correlated with sustained 
levels of economic growth. 
The relationship between trade or the free movement of goods and capital on economic 
performance is one of the central controversies in international political economy literature 
(Afonso, 2001; Spanu, 2003; Kudo and Mieno, 2007). This is not least because trade 
liberalization can only improve when it is complemented by proper macro-economic policies. 
The impact of trade on economic performance is affected by such factors as the level of 
development and the state of the international economy. The liberalization of international 
trade has led to an unprecedented growth of the global economy due among other things to an 
increase in the flow of capital, new and efficient technological innovations and enhanced skills 
exchange between countries. For example, Dee et al (2011: 3) found that the liberalization of 
trade through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers had a positive impact on the 
growth of employment in countries like South Africa, Mexico and Korea of between 4% and 
5%. 
Tussie and Agio (n.d) examined the effects of trade liberalization on the economies of Sub-
Saharan African countries of Malawi and Zambia. While they insisted not implying any causal 
relationship, they noted that an increase in trade failed to ameliorate worsening economic and 
social crises in these countries. Moreover, international trade is not equally beneficial for the 
various participants with developed countries seemingly benefiting more than developing 
countries. Radical Marxist scholars in the third world like Wallerstein (1974); Emmanuel 
(1972) argued that international trade had led to the terms of international trade directly leads 
to the underdevelopment of third world countries through the unbridled siphoning of low-value 
raw materials and natural resources. They point out that international trade is essentially 
exploitative with developed countries benefitting at the expense of poor countries in the global 
South. 
Du Plessis and Smit (2005) in their study of the relationship between trade and economic 
growth in South Africa found that the former had positive effect on the latter. South Africa 
experience lowest economic growth levels (0.8%) during the politically induced trade embargo 
of 1985-94. Once the trade embargo was lifted following the demise of apartheid in 1994 there 
was a marked rise in growth rate in the following decade with an average of 3% (Du Plessis 
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and Smit, 2005: 4). Balassa (1978) found that third world countries that were more open to 
international trade had by far superior levels of economic growth as compared to those 
countries that adopted inward policies. The import substitution policies adopted by some Latin 
American countries eliminated competition from foreign industries and increased the cost of 
doing business which stifled economic growth. The TDCA while it looks very much like a win-
win situation may still not be completely immune to the charges raised by the dependency 
theorists. South Africa being considerably less developed than Europe may very likely find 
itself being compelled to play along to the dictates of the EU even when it is against its own 
interest. 
In their examination of Myanmar’s economic development, Kudo and Mieno (2007: 4) note 
that the adoption of a considerably liberal trade policy by the government there, led to 
acceleration in economic growth and technological advancement. Helpman (2012: 3) sheds 
more light on the importance of trade on economic development from a historical perspective 
as he argues that although trade did not singularly bring about industrial revolution in Europe, 
it was an indispensable factor. However, scholars have shown that the relationship between 
economic growth and trade is not an entirely clear-cut affair. Schularick and Solomou (2009: 
2) point out that some of the industrialized countries experienced high levels of economic 
growth under high-tariff protectionist regimes which constrained trade. What emerges from the 
foregoing brief survey of scholarship on the relationship between trade and economic 
development is that the impact of trade growth depends on the specific circumstances of each 
country. One particularly important point is that increasing the volume of trade is not a one-
stop solution to economic stagnation but should be supported by economy-wide reforms as 
well. 
2.2  Absolute Advantage 
The theory of absolute advantage was propounded by Adam Smith in 1776. In this theory, he 
argued that for the international trade to be beneficial to all parties involved, then each country 
should produce at least one commodity to which it has absolute advantage of producing at the 
lowest possible cost so as to be exported to other trading partners (Carbaugh, 2002: 29). The 
theory further argues that the advantages of free trade at an unchecked space will be as a result 
of each country specializing in the export and production of commodities to which it can 
produce at comparatively lowest cost, while importing from its trading partners’ other 
commodities that they more efficiently produced at the lower cost (Hill, 2007: 167). 
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Accordingly, Smith argue that specialization and the division of labour is a requirement for 
economic growth. Hence, he posits that the extent of the market limits the division of labour 
within the economy. In other words, specialization is relatively difficult in a small market as 
compare to a large market size. The theory therefore, argue that international trade will increase 
the market size for any given country hereby allowing for specialization within the economy. 
This global division of labour will thus be of advantage to all countries by increasing global 
output and productivity (Hill, 2007). The theory also argues that market determination in 
relation to the import and export of each country will be determined by the invisible hand of 
the economy and market determinism as against government policies (Hill 2007: 166). 
Hill (2007) and Carabaugh (2002), among others, argue that the theory of absolute advantage 
is the foundational theory for the neoclassical trade models (Schumacher 2012: 64).  Smith 
ideas were centred on historical reconstruction. He believed that in order to trade nations had 
to be wealthy and that nations should only trade if it’s beneficial to them. If it wasn’t beneficial 
for nations to engage in trade it meant that they were not meant to trade (Schumacher 2012). 
When describing and illustrating the theory of absolute advantage, it is normally presented as 
two countries and two commodities (2x2 model). This connotes that each country can 
ultimately produce one commodity at lesser cost than the other and thus produce the 
commodity more comparatively cheap. This would mean each nation has an absolute advantage 
over the other. However, this would also mean there are no further gains from international 
trade besides the fact that it is only a once-off increase in overall production and thus 
consumption. This would entail that nothing more happens (Schumacher 2012). “Smiths 
concerns and ideas are dwarfed by the theory of comparative advantage, and is criticised as 
only being able to explain a small part of trade and ultimately a poor trade theorist” 
(Schumacher 2012: 65-67). 
2.3 Comparative Advantage 
The theory of comparative advantage as popularised by David Ricardo, argues that within the 
international system, countries should specialise in the production of commodities it can 
efficiently produce the most and purchase those it cannot from other countries which produce 
such good. The theory argues that to maintain comparative advantage, countries should 
produce those commodities it can efficiently produce the most and buy other commodities from 
other countries even if it can produce more efficiently than them (Hill, 2007: 177). The 
argument of this theory is largely counterintuitive. However, the theory argues that less 
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developed countries with no absolute advantage in any commodity in the global arena can 
benefit from the comparative advantage model just as developed countries can as well benefit 
from the model (Hill, 2007). 
Using the comparative advantage model, countries with no absolute advantage could still 
benefit from trade arrangements even though its production capacity is less efficient than other 
countries within the global arena (Suranovic, 2007: 40). Unlike the Adams Smith’s absolute 
advantage which emphasis the absolute cost principles, the theory of comparative advantage 
focus on the doctrine of relativity of cost difference (Carbaugh, 2002: 29). 
Hill (2007), Suranovic (2007) and Carabaugh (2002), among others, tried to illustrate and 
explain the theory of comparative advantage as propounded by David Ricardo. The theorists 
believed that there were no externalities and that total private costs and total social costs were 
the same. However due to political processes within each nation, this might not particularly be 
the same. It also does not take into account environmental costs (Prasch 1996). 
The theory of comparative advantage also stated there is free and costless mobility of capital 
and labour skills within a given country. This is never the case; complex skills and expensive 
facilities; may for instance, be relatively immobile. For example, when industries close down 
these skills cannot be redeployed (Prasch 1996: 41). Ricardo also assumed full employment of 
all available capital and labour. However, there are theoretical and measurement difficulties 
with this concept, if there are underutilized but potential productive resources are available to 
the economy (Prasch 1996: 43). 
Ricardo believed that the trade between countries is always balanced. This assumption does 
not exist. John Cullbertson argued that, “the decentralized nature of a free trade regime, 
operating in conjunction with modern credit arrangements between modern decentralized 
economies, provides no prior reason to believe that a country’s trade will be in balance at any 
given moment in time, or even over periods of time,” (Culbertson 1984: 117-121). In the theory 
of comparative advantage Ricardo articulated that capital flows do not cross international 






2.4 The Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model has its theoretical foundation on Ricardo`s theory of 
comparative advantage. The model involves the combination of the relative cost of production 
in conjunction with the factors of production (i.e. land, labour and capital) in the determination 
of a country`s comparative advantage. The H-O model central argument is that a country will 
export commodities to which it has a higher factor endowment while it imports those it has a 
low endowment factor (Hill, 2007: 181).  The H-O model assumed that two countries were 
involved and that each country has two factors which were labour and capital. It assumed that 
there was perfect competition in both commodity and factor markets and that all production 
functions were homogeneous. Each country however, differed in factor supply and each 
commodity in factor intensity. The model assumes that there was full employment of resources 
in the two countries and that demands are in all ways identical in countries. It also assumes that 
trade in both countries was free and there were no trade restrictions as well as no transport costs 
(Hill 2007). 
Hill (2007), among others, tried to explain and illustrate the H-O theory. However, there are 
some aspects lacking in this theory. The H-O theory is based on some unrealistic assumptions. 
Firstly, it assumes two countries, two commodities and no transport cost, this is not the case in 
a globalized world. It also assumes that there is no qualitative difference in factors of 
production, identical production functions and a constant return to scale. It does not include 
consumer demand. According to Haberler, the H-O theory is based on partial equilibrium as it 
fails in providing a comprehensive, general and complete equilibrium analysis. (Akrani 2011). 
2.5  Trade Barriers in South Africa During Apartheid 
In 1910 South Africa became an independent country known as Union of South Africa. In 
1948, the apartheid policy became official when the National Party gained the majority seats 
in parliament. Under apartheid SA was divided into four racial groups, Whites, Asians, 
Coloureds and Blacks (Laverty 2007). The racial segregation was created such that whites were 
at the top and they received the best jobs, education and housing, Asians and Coloureds had 
fewer rights than white people but more than black people, they also lived in segregated 
neighbourhoods and attended segregated schools. Black people were at the bottom of the social 
ladder and they lived in poor segregated areas, attending poor segregated schools and receiving 
the poorest health care and job opportunities (Laverty 2007). 
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Realizing the dependence of apartheid South Africa on foreign capital, in 1959, anti-apartheid 
organizations called for sanctions against South Africa. This was due to the fact that capital for 
the first growth industries, diamond and gold mining came from Britain and after World War 
2 the US was playing a key role as manufacturing assumed increasing importance (Davis 1993: 
1). According to Davis (1993) the 1960’s and 1970s was boom years for the SA economy and 
foreign investment contributed immensely to SA’s gross domestic investment. However, the 
only people who benefited were South African whites. 
Levy (1999) outlined that many countries imposed trade and financial sanctions and a lot of 
foreign investments were withdrawn from South Africa. This began to cripple South African 
economy resulting in current account deficits.  As repression intensified Levy (1999) further 
explains that in the early 1960’s the United Nations (UN) implemented the arms embargo. This 
then forced SA to pay mark ups of up to 100 percent for purchasing arms in the black market 
leaving SA with outdated equipment, particularly aircraft (Davis 1993: 5). The UN also passed 
the 1962 resolution calling for a ban on exports or imports from SA, Britain and Japan were 
absorbing half of SA exports; West Germany, Belgium, France and Italy accounted for an 
additional 25 percent. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations 
from 1973 started to adopt the oil embargo on SA. In the 1960s a lively campaign was 
developed against the SA gold coin, “Krugerrand, the Polaroid Cooperation workers waged a 
successful campaign, risked their jobs to stop their employer from continuing to supply the SA 
government with film for its notorious identification card system,” (Davis 1993: 2). 
During the apartheid, trade barriers were imposed on South Africa despite the wide range of 
strategic interest’s countries had on SA. Almost every international organization and state 
imposed sanctions on SA, including the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the European 
Community, the Nordic states, Britain, France, Germany, Japan and the US adopted cultural, 
economic, and military sanctions against SA by the mid 1980’s, (Klotz 1995). This was 
beginning to cripple SA economy because they relied heavily on heavy machinery and hi-tech 
goods like computers, chemicals and oil. Gold played a key trading role, accounting for 40-50 
percent of foreign exchange earnings, so due to the sanctions the fall in the price of gold in 
1980 severely affected SA (Davis 1993: 2). 
Regardless of these sanctions, SA still remained resistant and the political situation still was 
not rectified and racial discrimination was still very much present. By the beginning of the 
1980s “divestiture campaign was beginning to win more than propaganda victories,” (Davis 
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1993: 3) It was such that by 1982 legislatures in Massachusetts, Michigan, Connecticut; and 
the cities of Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Grand Rapids approved measures to withdraw 300 
million US dollars from SA (Davis 1993: 3). 
So in 1985 President Botha declared a state of emergency to the situation in SA so there after 
Chase Manhattan Bank declared that they would not renew SA’s short term loans, putting SA 
into a liquidity crisis. Other lenders began to adopt this and follow suit, proceeding with 
multilateral sanctions (Levy 1999: 5). In the coming year the Rand continued to depreciate and 
in August the government temporarily close the stock exchange and foreign exchange markets 
and suspended interest payments on its debts, (Levy 1999:6). According to Levy (1999) in 
September the same year, the European Community imposed trade and financial sanctions on 
SA and the Commonwealth did the same soon after. The US went on to impose a limited export 
ban to further worsen the situation in SA; this was under Reagan’s administration. In 1986 in 
September the European Community banned imports of iron, steel, gold coins from and new 
investments in SA as they had seen that the apartheid regime was still resistant to changing 
their system of racial discrimination. Japan joined in by imposing similar sanctions to SA. SA 
was then banned from participating in international rugby and cricket competitions. 
Key companies pulled out of doing business with SA companies like Mobil. “Despite public 
pressure, US loans to SA continued to grow in the early 1980s reaching 4.7 billion dollars by 
the end of 1984. But the nature of foreign capital inflows significantly changed in the 1980s 
from direct investment, which seemed risky, to short term loans. SA foreign debt grew to 23 
billion US dollars in 1985, this was definitely a year of political and economic crisis for SA,” 
(Davis 1993: 4). SA banking system faced a state of panic in mid-1985 when Chase Manhattan 
of New York refused to renew SA loans, and because of this other banks followed suit crippling 
SA economy further. By the end of 1991, 28 states, 25 countries and 91 cities had taken 
economic action against corporations with investments in SA, this cost SA 20 billion US dollars 
(Davis 1993). According to Davis (1993: 5), SA businesses began to collapse as well as internal 
investments. Sanctions caused serious losses to exports such as iron, steel, uranium, clothing, 
fruit and coal. 
The end of apartheid in 1994 and the beginning of democratic rule represented a new beginning 
for SA and the Southern African Region. SA was trying to instil new policies to try and alleviate 
poverty and address inequality. The government embarked on policies and programmes geared 
toward ensuring economic development and sustainable growth, hence the development of the 
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Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution Programme (GEAR) (Padayachee and Desai 2015). According to Padayachee 
and Desai (2015), “the fundamental challenge facing SA is the need to find sustainable means 
to overcome the apartheid legacy of racial division, poverty, and inequality; to reverse decades 
of distortionary political, social and economic policies that disfavoured, rather than promoted 
development.” 
From a macroeconomic perspective SA has undergone two phases; in the first phase from 1994 
to 2002 SA had to adjust to the high probabilities of sudden reversals of capital inflows and 
they were having extreme difficulties attracting foreign direct investment. In the second phase 
(from 2002 to present), according to the macroeconomic policy there was a desire to maintain 
stability and increase growth rates in order to have stronger terms of trade (Loewald 2008: 2). 
SA from a microeconomic point of view faced challenges in terms of raising sustainable 
economic growth, challenges in terms of competitiveness, market structure and competition, 
productivity, tariff and pricing issues (Loewald 2008: 2) 
Loewald (2008: 6) states that the first decade of the post-apartheid until 2004 the real GDP 
growth equalled the potential output, what this means is that potential output increase by four 
percent per year. This was a concern to policy makers because it implied that there was a strain 
on the economic capacity of SA that was causing pressures on the economy. These were 
derived from the microeconomic challenges of market structure and competition, productivity, 
tariffs and pricing issues, which were all essential to increase potential output and raise 
sustainable levels of growth in SA. SA was still very much isolated and weak and there was an 
essential need to be integrated into the international economy so as to improve SA from a 
microeconomic and macroeconomic point of view. 
2.6 Theories and Concepts of Regional Integration and International Trade 
2.6.1 Regional Integration and Regional Cooperation 
As early as the first decade of the 20th century regional integration was on the agenda in Africa 
as evidenced by the establishment of the South African Customs Union (SACU) in 1910 and 
the East African Community in 1919 (Geda and Kebret, 2007: 358). However, the pace of 
regional integration in Africa was hindered by the colonial set-up. The issue reappeared on the 
agenda in the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 adopted by the Organization for African Unity 
(OAU) as colonialism began to recede. The Abuja Treaty of 1991 emphasized the need for the 
establishment of regional bodies that would constitute vital building blocks for a continent-
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wide economic community to go a long way in mitigating the economic difficulties bedevilling 
most African countries (Hartzenberg, 2011: 3). 
Integration refers to “a much more formal arrangement that involves some political and 
economic sacrifices as well as commitments, concessions, processes and political will to 
redefine participation in the international community,” (Adetula 2004: 4-5). According to 
Adetula (2004) when parts or units form an integration, it creates interdependency amongst 
each other, instead of focusing on their self-interests, countries are obliged to take into 
consideration the interests of the collective. Thus, the process of integration would entail 
shifting loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger centre whose 
institutions and processes would demand justification over those nation states. The extent to 
which transfer of loyalties and jurisdiction can be enjoyed would then depend on the goals and 
levels on integration schemes as well as socio-economic and political transformations which 
the implementation of integrative policies generates within and between the integrating units 
(Adetula 2004: 3-4). Melo and Tsikata (2014) pointed out that in Africa regional integration 
emerged as a central and crucial issue because of the inability of the continent’s small, isolated 
and unsustainable economies to trade effectively and profitably on their own. Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) like SADC and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) constitute a vital part of a comprehensive development strategy which seeks 
to provide opportunities for the smaller countries to sell their exports to a much larger market 
on fair times (Melo and Tsikata, 2014;2). 
There are different levels of integration from perspectives of different disciplines; political 
integration, social integration and economic integration. The linear model of regional 
integration which was adopted by SADC involves improving and cementing integration 
through different levels starting with a Free Trade Area (FTA), followed by Customs Union, 
and Common Market (Hartzenberg, 2011: 2). After the establishment of a common market then 
comes an Economic Union which involves the integration of fiscal and economic policies of 
the member countries. The last stage is the Political Union in which the countries’ economic 
and foreign policies are managed centrally by the regional or supra-national body. 
However, this research is primarily concerned with economic integration. Economic 
integration can be seen as “the gradual fusion and harmonization of major structural areas 
within the economy such as investment and tax system, the financial sector, tariff reduction, 
reforms in the labour market, legal and regulatory systems among others which enables 
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countries within the union pool resources together in other to take advantage of the global and 
regional institutions and human resources” (Sako, 2006). 
Regional cooperation on the other hand, is mainly a strategy that focuses on self- reliance and 
development within that region (Adetula 2004: 2). The “motives for regional cooperation 
therefore include broad economic, social and political interest, and the need for greater 
international bargaining power,” (Adetula 2004: 2). However, there is a need to make a clear 
distinction between regional integration and cooperation as there is confusion between the two. 
Though both concept is closely related, there is a clear cut line that differentiate them. Regional 
integration involves the gradual, but continuous merger of different aspect of the economy of 
the states involved until a final union is achieved. Regional cooperation is therefore, the 
mechanism and strategy used in ensuring that the process is mutual between the parties 
involved (Hartzenberg, 2011; Melo and Tsikata, 2014).  Regional cooperation is hence, the 
means for facilitating regional integration.  After countries have entered into an agreement to 
integrate their markets, the next step is to ensure cooperation in order for their integration to be 
effective. Hence, each country must cooperate, in accordance with the terms and agreements 
(Adetula 2004; Hartzenberg, 2011; Melo and Tsikata, 2014). 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are the products of relationships formed by states within 
a region in a bid to facilitate and improve trade and development. The RTAs generally covers 
certain communities and is achieved by a gradual elimination, and or reduction in tariffs as 
well as the removal of quotas. However, Meyn (2005) argue that regional economic integration 
as well as intra-regional trade and investment are generally slow and low respectively. With 
particular focus on SADC, Meyn (2005: 187) argues that the region is lagging in integration 
due to a number of challenges such as dependence on import revenues, little or no partners for 
intra-regional trade, as well as overlap in membership of regional bodies. 
Hartzenberg (2011: 3) notes that the slow progress of integration may be due to the acute lack 
of infrastructure which makes trade between African countries more expensive. Melo and 
Tsikata (2014: 7) point out those violent conflicts common in West, East and North Africa are 
important challenges hindering regional integration efforts. Security issues are also important 
in the SADC region as well with high risks of conflict in countries such as Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Lesotho and Angola threatening to delay the economic regionalization efforts. 
In order for an effective regionalization within SADC, the organisation and region would have 
to adopt market integration approach as mechanism for integration. These will be determined 
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by the free flow of the factors capital and human resources, liberalisation of intra-regional 
trade, as well as the practice of comparative advantage among others (Gibb 2009: 708). 
Sako (2006) expresses the need for regional integration through cooperation. He mainly 
emphasizes the need for an effective implementable regional integration process that should be 
used to effectively deal with development challenges that are internal. He outlines the 
challenges of why Africa is not reaching this level and outlines the advantages of cooperation 
and integration to developmental programs. The next section will discuss the models of 
integration that have been adopted by the different regional bodies as a blueprint to expedite 
the integration process. 
2.6.2 Gravity Model and Regional Integration 
One of the analytical tools that are used to understand the increasing regionalization of trade is 
the gravity model. According to Khumalo et al (2013:12), the gravity models is parallel in 
analysis to Newton’s equation of gravity. The model uses the distance between trade partners 
as well as their income in explaining their bilateral trade flows. The model also explains trade 
patterns using historical, cultural and langue ties as against explanations based on comparative 
or absolute advantage.  Frankel et al (1995: 69) defines the gravity model as a systematic 
framework which allows for the measurement of the normalcy of bilateral trade in the global 
arena. The aim is to measure or gauge the impact of simple economic factors on regional trade 
and the factors peculiar only to the specific region. According to Antonucci and Manzocchi 
(2005: 158) the gravity model basically tries to explain the increasing importance of RTAs on 
the international trade system citing such factors as geographical proximity and size of the 
economy as major determinants of volume of trade between countries. Therefore, according to 
the gravity model trade between countries in the SADC regional bloc is likely to be spurred on 
by low transport costs as a result of their geographical contiguity. 
The Gravity model is a model that is widely used in policy applications in areas such as 
identifying important markets for trade promotion among others. However, according to 
Ciuriak and Curtis (2006: 189-197), one of the criticisms of the gravity model is that it doesn’t 
take into account comparative advantage. It also fails to consider the importance of strategic 
national interest as a factor to trade agreements between states. 
2.6.3 Market Integration and the Levels of Integration 
Market Integration is modelled around Balassa’s conventional analysis of economic integration 
in which he emphasised the arguments of customs union theory. According to Balassa, market 
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integration is described as a process of progressive integration in which there are several 
hierarchical arrangements and levels. This involves the movement from preferential trade, to 
free trade, to customs unions, to common markets and from economic union to a final political 
union,” (Gibb 2009: 706). 
Market Integration theory however, fails to explore the influence of non-state actors as well as 
the spatial and temporal individuality of the states involved. The theory also placed less focus 
on the impart of domestic politics on market integration, particularly African politics (Gibb 
2009). Gibb further argues that market integration is largely Eurocentric. Hence, Gibb (2009) 
argued that if examined from a postcolonial perspective, Africa’s regional integration has been 
structured by Western imposition of what should constitute regional integration structure. 
2.6.4 Neo- Functionalism and Regional Integration 
Neo-functionalism is a theory of regional integration which place focal point on the roles of 
non-state actors and social interest as integral dynamics for integration (Hamad, 2016). 
According to Meyn (2005: 188), Neo-functionalism fosters a smoother form of market 
integration. Neo-functionalism argue that integration begins with co-operation within some 
specific sectors of the economy. Hence, institutions within the region are thus meant to promote 
intra- regional cooperation. These include among many others, cooperation in monetary 
policies, promotion of the private sector, investment, regulations, competition policy, as well 
as the free movement of capital and labour (Meyn 2005: 192).  The neo-functional theory 
assumes, “that regional integration which is directed via a supra-national element will produce 
a spill over effect from one sector to another (Meyn 2005: 188).  Neo-functionalism is 
important because it is one of the frameworks that guide the formation of regional organizations 
in Africa. Examples of such organisation in Africa includes the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), SADC, ECOWAS, SACU, etc. (Meyn 2005: 188). 
2.6.5 World Systems Theory 
The world systems theory which was originally articulated in the 1970’s by Immanuel 
Wallerstein offers the most competent analytical framework for the TDCA. The theory is a 
wide-ranging historical and, to borrow Martinez-Vela (2001: 1)’s term, “macro-sociological” 
analysis of the global economic system and the history and reality of unequal and uneven 
economic development. Moreover, the theory was articulated to explain the historical origins 
of the contradictions visible in the global economic system as testified by the grinding poverty 
of the Third World and the palpable affluence of the First World countries (Hall and Chirot, 
19 
 
1982: 81). According to Wallerstein (1974) the origins of the world-capitalist can be traced to 
back to the sixteenth century when compelled by the excess production under its capitalist 
system European countries began to explore the world to find markets for their surplus 
products. It was during these adventures that Europe more or less imposed its economic system 
on non-European countries. Needless to say, being the architectures of the newly established 
economic system, the West was better-placed to benefit more than other parties. 
Wallerstein sought to present the nation-states in the world and their components as actors and 
participants in a single albeit grossly asymmetrical and exploitative economic, political and 
legal system. The world systems theory was propagated from the dependency theory and 
Marxist methodologies. It argues that the world is essentially a social system, with boundaries, 
structures within member groups, rules of legitimation and coherence (Wallerstein, 1974: 347-
349). The system is characterized by “a world economy, integrated through the market system 
in which two or more actors are interdependent with respect to market necessities such as food, 
fuel and protection (Martinez-Vela, 2001: 3). 
Wallerstein argued that the world system is based on division of labour which facilitates the 
production and flow of basic goods and services. This division of labour creates 
interdependence between different countries which leads to the emergence of core and 
periphery regions. The core comprises developed countries with sophisticated manufacturing, 
which are technologically advanced and highly skilled labour. The periphery on the other hand 
consists of underdeveloped countries with a virtually non-existent manufacturing base with an 
economy dependent on primary goods, stagnant technology and high levels of capital flight 
(Hall and Chirot, 1982: 85). As such, both the core and the periphery are structurally dependent 
on one another.  Halsall (1997), Rossem, (1996), Alexander, (1998) and Gowan (2015) 
however, noted that between the core and periphery is the semi periphery nations which are 
midway in development between the core and periphery. The semi periphery serves as buffer 
zones between the two extremes and are made up of states from the periphery striving to 
improve their economic and development lot so as to join the core state status, or former core 
states declining in their economy and development (Halsall, 1997; Rossem, 996; Alexander, 
1998; Gowan, 2015). 
Wallerstein argue however, that the system is fundamentally structured to favour the core 
which enjoys high levels of economic development at the expense of the semi periphery and 
periphery which suffers underdevelopment as a consequence.  The core states promote capital 
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accumulation using various means at their disposal. These states have comparatively superior 
military, economic and political power to ensure the enforcement of unequal exchange between 
the core and periphery (Martinez-Vela 2001). 
Thus, the TDCA arrangement, the subject of the present study, can be viewed or analysed to 
an important extent through the world systems lens. The theory help outlines the background 
conditions in terms of political and economies, of the parties entering the trade deal. it also 
helps locate the respective parties’ position on Wallerstein’s core-periphery spectrum. 
Therefore, the theory is instructive for this research as it helps explain how the disparate 
economic, political and legal leverage disproportionately favour the EU over South Africa. 
South Africa is, by and large, a semi-peripheral country with a modestly modern industrial base 
in a transition phase from peripheral to core. Europe on the other hand belongs to the core 
category as it possesses the characteristics of that category almost to the letter as described by 
Wallerstein. The theory also serves to explain the structural position of South Africa vis a vis 
other members of SADC which are mostly within the periphery spectrum.  
2.6.6 Theory of Realism 
Realism is an international relations theory which revolves round the concept of “real politick” 
(Morgenthau, 2014). Real politick is a diplomacy principle based on the consideration of real 
factors such as power, national interest and economy rather than moral or ethical principles 
(Baylis, 2013). The major argument of the realist theory is that the international system is 
driven by the concept national interest which is defined in terms of power among actors (state 
and non-state) pursuing conflicting interest. Hence, Realism views the international system as 
a struggle for power among states with self-interest which sometimes could be antagonistic 
(Walt, 1998). Realism is anchored on the proposition that the international system is anarchic 
in structure, and made up of state actors who are presumed to be unitarily rational in the pursuit 
of their national interests which are geared toward survival (Burchill et al, 2013; Weber, 2013).  
States within the international system act in ways to ensure the protection of their national 
interest (Morgenthau, 2014). 
The theory of realism serves in analysing the rationale and benefits of trade agreements 
between the European Union and South Africa, as well as the rationale behind the exist of 
Britain from the European Union. The theory also serves in explaining the rationale behind the 
trade agreement between the parties involved (South Africa and European Union), and by 




Summarily, this chapter surveyed existing scholarship in making a general appraisal of the 
nexus between trade and economic development. This was motivated in order to make 
informed and balanced analysis of the possible repercussions of the TDCA on South Africa 
and its immediate neighbours’ economic performance. Based on the literature surveyed, the 
chapter concludes that relationship between trade and economic performance is one of the 
central controversies in international political economy literature. The chapter went further to 
make an analysis of the theories of absolute advantage and comparative advantage as 
propounded by Adam Smith and Ricardo David respectively. Based on this premises of the 
literature, the chapter argued that while some nations may possess an absolute advantage in 
international trade, nations without absolute advantage can enjoy comparative advantage in the 
international system. The chapter went on to discuss regional integration theories as well as the 
world systems theory and realism as the theoretical framework for the study’s analysis. 
The next chapter will look the trade agreement between SA and EU and the impact it has on 
SA from the lenses of the world systems theory and realism. The theory of realism as espoused 
by the realists serve to explain the rationale behind the trade agreement as well as the 
mechanism which moves the flow of the trade agreement between South Africa and the 
European Union. It also helps explains the rationale behind British exit of the EU as well as 




The TDCA and the South African economy 
3.1 Introduction 
The South Africa and the EU TDCA is considerably vast and is likely to have a significant 
impact on the economy of South Africa. Under the deal, the two parties undertook to cooperate 
in a broad array of economic and social sectors that are vital to their two economies. Relying 
on data from the EU commission and other sources, this chapter attempts to analyse the impact 
of the TDCA on the quality and growth or lack thereof of the South African economic 
performance. On the basis of realism as a theoretical framework, this chapter will adopt a 
sector-by-sector approach to conduct a clear analysis of how South Africa and the EU trade 
relations have affected such sectors as manufacturing, agriculture, tourism and foreign direct 
investment among others. Moreover, the chapter will seek to show whether the core-periphery 
relations have been reinforced under the TDCA deal or whether South Africa’s economy is 
now more dynamic. Further, the chapter will also discuss how the TDCA has influenced South 
Africa’s economic relations with its fellow SACU partners who were also directly and 
indirectly affected by the TDCA deal. 
3.2 Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) 
South Africa’s post-apartheid regime made several attempts after the end of the apartheid 
policy in the country to re align herself to the global trading community. The European Union 
became the first major player in the global arena to which South Africa entered into trade 
negotiations with after Apartheid (Larsen, 2007). Upon series of negotiations, the Trade 
Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) was jointly signed and agreed upon by 
South Africa and the European Union in 2000. The objective of the agreement was mainly to 
create a free market in which the parties involved could engage in the trade of agricultural and 
industrial goods. This trade agreement has been widely heralded as the most demanding and 
aggressive trade agreement the EU had ever concluded with partners from geographically 
distant countries (Larsen 2007:857). 
According to Assarson (2005) the main objective of the TDCA was to improve bilateral trades 
of industrial and agricultural products between the parties involve, and in the process, provide 
a platform for political and socio-economic cooperation. Before the trade agreement was 
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signed, were about 24 rounds of talks and negotiations between the European Union and South 
Africa at several platforms. The EU and South Africa agreed to the elimination of tariffs for a 
ten and twelve-year period respectively on a large percentage of their commodities with a 
special attention for industrial and agricultural products (Carim, 2005). In addition, a large 
percentage of South Africa’s agricultural products were granted unrestricted access to the EU 
market. 
Lee (2010) further observed that both South Africa and the European union have a comparative 
advantage as relating to different aspect of trade. While South Africa has an advantage in labour 
force, agricultural products, textile, wine and natural resources, the EU has an advantage in 
over South Africa in capital, technology, and skilled resources. Also while South Africa export 
raw material such as minerals, metals and vegetables among others into the EU, it in turn 
imports industrial commodities such as iron and steel products, chemical products as well as 
machinery. Hence, according to Lemon (2000), the manufacturing sector of South Africa will 
be the major beneficiary of the TDCA. Assarson (2005) corroborate the arguments that South 
Africa stands to gain more from the TDCA by using the trade creation and diversion model in 
showing how the liberalization of trade has been beneficial for South Africa. 
Lee (2010: 102) argued that SA negotiating power within the international community as well 
as the with the EU in particular would have been more viable and strengthen had it postpone 
the TDCA negotiations till when it had implemented to a large extend, its development 
strategies. The refusal to allow SA join the Lome Convention general trade provision was a 
calculated attempt by the EU to ensure SA perpetual dependence on the EU so as to allow for 
her continuous exploitation. Hence, the chance of the TDCA leading to economic growth and 
development for SA economy is minimal without the implementation of a development 
strategy (Lee, 2010).  
Kaplinsky et al (2002) support Lee (2010) summations and further argued that the continuous 
adoption of import substitution strategy negatively affects the upgrading capacity of firms 
within the economy. Todaro and Smith (2002) also observed that the adoption of import 
substitution strategy in South Africa, as with other developing countries failed due to the 
conditions that leads to the inefficiency in production as well as high cost of import. This is 
also compounded by the failure of the industries to build up with the local suppliers, backward 




3.3 South Africa and EU Trade Growth Trends 
Since the signing of the TDCA in 1999, the EU has increasingly consolidated its place as South 
Africa's largest trade partner. As figure 1 below shows, trade between the two parties has been 
growing in leaps and bounds. Export from South Africa to the European Union between 2005 
and 2014 make up approximately 25% of its total exports of R382.28 billion (EU Commission, 
2014). The elimination of tariff rates on vast amount of products has meant that the EU’s 
products have extensive access to the South African markets. EU import into South Africa are 
largely composed of durable capital and industrial goods like machinery and appliances as well 
transport equipment among others, thus placing South Africa in a good position for sustained 
future economic development. 
Figure 1: The growth of trade between EU and SA (2005-2014) 
 
In 2014 the EU and SA’s Southern African partners concluded the long-standing Southern 
African Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) talks. The countries included Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland (with Angola having the option 
to join the agreement in future) and of course the EU. The EPA is so much more than a mere 
trade agreement – it is an agreement for economic development in Southern Africa. The EPA 
is also meant to streamline the provisions of the TDCA with the regional trade policies since it 
is directly relevant to the prior agreements South Africa had entered into with its regional 
partners. 
 
It is important to note at this point that the South African export to the EU consists of roughly 
50% of manufactured goods and thus underpins one of the South Africa's most pressing 
Source: Adapted from European Commission, http://trade.ec.europa.eu. 
Figure 1 above shows statistics on the amount of trade between EU and SA from 2005 to 2014. 
From 2006 to 2009 South Africa exported more goods to the EU and enjoyed a favourable 





2005 and 2009 recorded the lowest trade volumes between the two parties with a value of 35 
million euros. Trade (import and export) between the two parties reached its peak in 2011 
totalling around 48 million euros before dropping gradually in the following years to 42.2 
million euros in 2014. In terms of imports and exports, EU’s exports to SA have increased from 
R36 billion in 1994 to R109 billion in 2013. This means that imports from the EU to South 
Africa have, on average, 13% increased per year over the period and imports by SA have 14% 
increase over the same period of 10 years. Exports from SA to the EU have increased from R20 
billion to R80 billion between 1994 and 2003. This constitutes a 17% annual average growth 
rate over this period. SA exports to the EU have shown significant growth. This also takes into 
account that on the general, SA’s total exports have increased by 14 percent within the same 
period (Kalaba et al 2005: 8).  
































Figure 2b: SA-EU trade in goods 
 
Source: EU Commission 2014 
Figures 2 (a) and (b) above show a further breakdown of EU and SA trade into goods and 
services respectively. The division of trade into goods and services enables an analysis of 
human and material capital involved in the trade transactions between the parties involved. 
EU’s imports of goods from South Africa have been declining. The value of these imports 
goods declined, by close to 25% between 2012 and 2014 from 24 billion euros to 18 billion 
euros. EU exports of goods to South Africa also decreased but not sharply from 25 billion to 
23 billion euros. This may be due to the EU’s reluctance to remove duties on some of South 
Africa’s products coming into the EU. Trade in services on the other hand has been relatively 
more unstable. It decreased by about 50% from a peak of 7 billion euros in 2012 to under 3 
billion in 2013. 
 3.4 The Content of Trade: Core-Periphery Patterns Reinforced 
One of the main objectives of this research is to investigate whether the TDCA would be able 
to mitigate and rebalance the core-periphery patterns that define the global economic system 
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Figure 3: SA’s trade in manufactured goods with the EU 
 
Source: EU Trade Statistics 
The norm in the global economic system has been that the less developed countries’ exports 
tend to be dominated by primary goods. While the developed regions, in this case the EU, 
export mainly manufactured and processed goods leading to a huge imbalance in the balance 
of payments. Figure 3 shows that the TDCA has not helped much in transforming the South 
African economy from the typical periphery economy dependent on primary and extractive 
industries. Figure 3 shows that in 2014 SA struggled with significant EU import penetration of 
the manufacturing sector. Only in iron and steel did SA have favorable balance of trade. But in 
other manufacturing goods like chemicals, semi-manufactured goods, machinery, textiles, 
clothing and others SA had a negative balance of trade. This may suggest that the extensive 
measures taken towards the liberalization of trade under the TDCA may not be good for the 
development of the manufacturing sector in the long run. SA’s infant industries are struggling 
to fend off competition from their more established and well-resourced European counterparts. 
Figures 4 and 5 below further paint a clear picture of the lack of structural transformation of 




















































































Figure 4: SA trade balance in manufactures with EU 2011-2014 
 
 
Figure 5: SA balance of trade in primary products 2011-2014 
 
Source: compiled author using data from European Commission, 2015. The European Union 
trade in goods with South Africa. Available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113447.pdf 
Figures 4 and 5 above are a comparison of SA’s trade performance in manufactured goods and 
primary products between 2011 and 2014 under which the TDCA has been fully operational. 
South Africa’s trade in manufactures is well in the negative as displayed in figure 4. While 












































between 2011-2014, its imports from the same region reached an average of 20 billion euros 
thus resulting in 150% negative trade balance. 
However, the trends are reversed in the primary products category with SA’s trade balance 
being consistently in the positive. Between 2011 and 2014 SA imported an average of just 
under 3 billion euros’ worth of primary goods while exporting an average of 7 billion euros 
thus creating more than 50% trade surplus. These trends present grave concerns for the South 
African economy. While the trade balance in the primary sector is positive it is offset by the 
enormous trade deficit in the manufacturing sector. 
Figure 6: The performance of agricultural and manufacturing sectors 2012-2014 
 
Source: Compiled by author using data from The South African Reserve Bank. Quarterly 
Bulletin March 2015. Available at www.resbank.co.za 
The trends displayed in figure 6 above confirm South Africa’ status as a typical peripheral 
economy struggling to diversify its industrial sector. The manufacturing sector has had to 
endure a sluggish performance since the TDCA became fully operational. The sector has 
contracted by 1,8% between 2012 and 2014 posting a positive growth of 1,9% in 2012 and 
declining to a paltry 0,1% in 2014. Moreover, the three quarters recorded for 2014 posted 
negative growth for the sector. This is in direct contrast to the trends obtaining in the 
agricultural sector during the same period. While the sector seemed to struggle in 2012 and the 
first two quarters of 2013 posting negative growth, it recovered spectacularly growing by 1,5% 
in 2013 and an impressive 4,6% in 2014. This perhaps explains South Africa’s positive trade 
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is anything to go by, the TDCA would arrest or significantly slow the pace of South Africa’s 
industrialization. These points to the inability of local firms to withstand international 
competition and the TDCA cannot be said to have made things better in that regard (2015 
Budget review). 
3.4.1 EU Import Penetration in the Agricultural Sector 
Figure 7: EU imports in SA’s agricultural sector 
 
Source: Adapted from Obinyelukau, M. 2013. South Africa’s trade relations with the EU: 
Implications for the local agricultural sector. Newsletter of International Trade Administration 
Commission of South Africa. May 2013: Volume 1. 
Agricultural imports from the EU into South Africa have grown steadily since the signing of 
the TDCA. Imports from the EU increased from just under 30% of SA’s total agricultural 
imports in 2001 to over 35% in 2012. According to Obinyelukau (2013) the monetary value of 
the imports grew from US$200 million in 2001 to US$1,6 billion in 2012. According to the 
2014 figures released by the EU commission the value of trade between the SA and the EU 
increase slightly to US$1,7 billion. However, compared to the manufacturing sector, EU 
agricultural imports have been limited. This might be due to the fact that many agricultural 
products are tariff-protected as they are classified under sensitive products. For instance, South 
Africa under the TDCA place fresh meat, dairy products, cereals and sugar on the list of its 
sensitive products. For the sensitive products there hasn’t been any removal of tariffs. Such a 
move could explain the agricultural sector’s steady growth from 2013 through to 2014 as the 
farmers are shielded from intense international competition. Having observed the suffering of 
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government may do well to consider protecting some of the manufacture products by placing 
them on the sensitive list. 
3.4.2 Trade in Various Agricultural Products 




Source: EU Commission on Trade Statistics 
Figure 8 above shows the trade flow between the EU and South Africa on individual 
agricultural products like animal products, vegetable products and food stuffs and tobacco 
between 2011 and 2014. The tables show that the EU dominates the trade in animal products 
and foodstuffs and tobacco while South Africa dominates the trade in vegetable products. South 
Africa has an average of over 1 billion euros’ worth of exports of vegetable products annually 


























































seems South Africa’s horticulture industry has found a ready and big market in the EU which 
may enable it to expand and creating more employment in the process. However, the South 
African food, animal and tobacco industries have to find ways of expanding and improving so 
as to pushback against EU’s aggressive import penetration in these sectors as shown by the 
figures above. South Africa has an average trade deficit of over 200 million in foodstuffs and 
tobacco trade with the EU between 2011 and 2014 and recorded another deficit of over a 100 
million euros in animal products. 
3.4.3 Investment 
The TDCA has not only strengthened SA-EU trade relations but has also opened new 
opportunities for investment which is an important factor in driving economic growth and 
generating much needed employment. Almost 2, 5 billion euros was invested by European 
companies in different sectors of the South African economy. 
Figure 9: EU investment flows to South Africa in 2013 
 
Source: European Commission, 2015. Trade: Countries and Regions. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-africa/ . 
The EU countries boast of a share of 80% of foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in South 
Africa. The FDI flow into South Africa fell by 24% from U$6-billion in 2011 to U$4.5-billion 
in 2012, but it picked up in 2013 showing an increase of FDI into SA. This was mostly through 
infrastructure projects. South Africa requires increased levels of FDI in order to fund the South 
African Government's infrastructure plan, to be able to generate sufficient employment and 
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Figure 10 shows the distribution of European investments into different sectors of the economy 
which is mostly infrastructure oriented. Water and the industrial sectors got the largest share 
of investment at 18% and 24% respectively. Small-to-medium enterprise (SMEs) sector got 
14% while roads and electricity got 10% and 11% respectively. This is in line with the SA 
government’s policy which focuses on poverty alleviation and creating economic growth. 
Figure 10: The distribution of EU investment in South Africa 
Source: European Investment Bank. 2013. Available at 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/eib_in_south_africa_en.pdf 
While the presence of foreign investment in various sectors of the economy is a welcome 
development in terms of the employment and economic growth generation South Africa still 
has to exercise caution in its management of foreign investment. Foreign investors may crowd 
out or outcompete their local counterparts and oftentimes that is the case. Thus the growing 
presence of foreign investment might stall the growth of local industries thus keeping South 
Africa in the status of a peripheral economy reinforcing the core-periphery relations. There is 
need for policymakers to protect local industries or avail funding so they can compete with 
their well-resourced EU counterparts. 
3.4.4 The Mining Sector Performance 
Mining is one of South Africa’s crucial economic sectors as it is a significant source of 
government revenue and employment. South Africa’s major mining exports include gold, 
platinum and diamond. Figure 10 below gives a picture of the export import trends in the sector 











Figure 11: Mining sector import/export performance (billion euros) 
 
Source: compiled by author based on the statistics from European Commission, 2015. The 
European Union trade in goods with South Africa. Available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113447.pdf 
SA mining section, like other primary industries in South Africa, enjoys a significant trade 
balance against the EU mining sector. South Africa has maintained a trade surplus of around 
400% since the TDCA became fully operational. However, the TDCA has failed to trigger a 
robust growth in the export performance of the mining sector. Indeed, the value of South 
Africa’s exports decreased from 5,9 billion euros in 2011 to 5,1 billion euros in 2014. The 
imports of mining products on the other hand have been more or less consistent only declining 
by 200 million euros from 2011 to 2014. Productivity in the mining sector has been sluggish 
in South Africa with the sector contracting by 1,6% in 2014. This has been due to among other 
things, low prices of minerals in the global markets, policy uncertainty on the part of the South 
African policy makers and labor unrest with frequent industrial action disrupting production. 
However, the picture in the mining sector vis-à-vis the TDCA also reinforces the point that the 
much-touted deal is not transformational. Thus South Africa remains a typical peripheral player 
in the global economic system. 
3.4.5 Trade in Individual Mining and Manufacturing Products 













Table 1:  SA trade with EU on various mining products 
Products Exports (million euros) Imports (million euros) 




2523 2451 1861 2062 66 107 86 36  
Petroleum 
products 
98 106 103 90 1086 1006 798 770  
Nonferrous 
metals 
1942 1442 1560 1884 171 202 162 264  
Iron ore 
and steel 
1464 1230 1152 1025 537 553 512 366  
          
Table 2: SA trade with EU in manufactured products 
Products Exports (million euros)  Imports (million euros) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Chemicals 693 738 735 744 3584 3804 3582 3788 
Machinery& 
Transport equipment 
3861 3142 3337 3431 13357 13377 12981 12189 
Electrical machinery 88 89 92 91 1244 1303 1409 1290 
Telecommunications 
Equipment 
98 83 53 69 1218 1095 702 488 
Pharmaceuticals 18 25 34 36 1091 1188 1087 1077 
Electronic data 
processing and office 
equipment 




The period 2011-2014 is when the TDCA became fully operative in both South Africa and the 
EU. The figures reveal the increasing and unmitigated pattern of core-periphery relationship 
between South Africa and the EU. South Africa dominated trade in the mining sector mainly 
in primary products like iron and steel, ores and minerals and nonferrous metals where the 
country enjoyed a trade surplus. However, the EU dominated trade in petroleum products 
enjoying a surplus of over 800 million euros annually on average. The manufacturing sector 
trends, as shown in table 2, paint a clear picture of EU dominance. The EU enjoys huge trade 
surplus in transport and electrical machinery equipment, chemicals, telecommunications and 
office equipment as well as in pharmaceuticals. This shows that the EU products are 
dominating the South African manufacturing sector and the country’s policymakers would 
have to put in place measures to grow the local manufacturing sector. It also points to the fact 
that the TDCA while it may be too early to judge may not help South Africa shed its peripheral 
status unless the government negotiates new tariff arrangements on manufactured products 
with the EU. One may be forced to conclude that perhaps the terms of the TDCA are perhaps 
too liberal to pull the South African economy out of the peripheral category or to even begin 
to close ranks with the EU. 
3.4.6 EU-SA: OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION 
3.4.6.1 Development 
The TDCA did not only make possible the expansion of trade between South Africa and the 
EU but also availed opportunities for cooperation with mutual benefit in other areas as well. 
The EU has consistently lent support to South Africa’s poverty alleviation efforts since 1994. 
Its cooperation program effectively addresses the challenges faced by South Africa in 
innovative ways. Hence, the initiatives developed under the EU-SA strategic partnership were 
developed to ensure socio-economic and political development.   
Between 1995 and 2006, the EU has availed €1.5 billion to projects in South Africa in various 
areas such as governance, education and training, health urban development, water and 
sanitation, and small and medium sized enterprise development. All this to strengthen 
democracy while getting people out of poverty by granting them increased access to resources 
and opportunities (van de Geer 2014). The EU started a seven-year support program (2007-
2013) of €980 million. The 2007-2013 program with its strong commitment to the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action has brought greater 
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alignment with South Africa's development priorities and is largely implemented through 
budget support, thus greatly reducing the costs of implementation. 
Even though South Africa today is acclaimed an upper-middle income country, it is still 
grappling with challenges faced by developing countries. South Africa’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is about R3.465 trillion with public expenditure around R1.149 trillion. The 
country has about 40% and 25% poverty and unemployment rate respectively with the youth 
more affected. The country is made up of unequal societies with a spatial pattern reflecting the 
configuration during the apartheid era. 
The EU-SA strategic partnership program between 2007 and 2013 covers a wide range of 
developmental projects and programs in 5 key areas. These are social cohesion and service 
delivery, employment creation, cooperation for Pan Africanism as well as provision of 
assistance in the implementation of the trade agreement. In 2012 the EU availed a 50-million-
euro loan to fund the implementation of the Khi Solar project that is aimed at providing more 
than 37 000 families with renewable energy (European Investment Bank). 
The program for the 2014-2020 periods is much reduced in size in close consultation with the 
South African Government and is focused on three areas: education, employment and assisting 
in strengthening the capable state. Such initiatives spearheaded by the EU may help to spur the 
growth of the South African industry if carefully managed and thus reduce the gap between the 
core and the periphery. 
3.4.6.2 Creating Employment 
Employment generation is one of the major challenges facing both the EU and South Africa 
but it is most acute in the latter. European companies and agencies have partnered with their 
South African counterparts in a bid to find strategies to boost job creation. One of the initiatives 
included the European Council's broad-based program to reduce youth unemployment, the 
Youth Employment Initiative which was formed in June 2013 (van de Geer, 2014). The EU is 
of the view that while Government can create the environment favorable to job creation and 
growth, it rarely creates jobs themselves. Investment and businesses are important factors to 
job creation. In South Africa, at least 2,000 European companies have invested over R60 billion 
(Foreign Direct Investment Stock) in the country and have created over 350,000 direct jobs 
(South African Government News Agency 2014). 
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The Local Economic Development program in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) as well as 
Eastern Cape have led to the creation of over 7000 jobs in support of poverty-stricken 
communities, promoting local competitiveness, strengthening local government and promoting 
private sector investment. In addition, a several number of people totaling over 4, 000, have 
been trained in several sector of the economy. This training covers business skills and 
community development, agriculture, etc. The benefits of the program have led to the 
expansion of the program by the provincial governments in Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal 
(European Investment Bank). 
The EU has also embarked on a number of innovative programs to effectively tackle the soaring 
unemployment in South Africa. For instance, over 12,000 jobs and 60,000 livelihoods have 
been supported through the EU Risk Capital Facility (RCF) providing support for 136 small 
and medium enterprises. This facility of €70 million also promoted further investment, 
enabling a total investment value of €266 million (van de Geer, 2014). It has further assisted 
in the creation of new development funds at the level of the implementing bank, the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and its Development Funds Department is now managing a 
large number of EU supported funds. 
The EU has also supported the implementation of the South African Government’s Community 
Works Program and well as its Expanded Public Works Program through a sector budget 
support program of €100 million to the South African Government. And to support the South 
African Government's infrastructure development program, an innovative €100 million EU 
instrument, the Infrastructure Investment Program for South Africa (IIPSA), has been put in 
place. If successful, the IIPSA model has the potential to be replicated with South African 
Government resources. 
3.5 South Africa’s International Trade Policy 
Industrialisation as the driver of economic growth and transformation has been at the centre of 
South Africa’s economic policies. The government has displayed a firm grasp of the 
importance of forex in accomplishing these goals hence its adoption of measures to institute a 
liberal trade regime. Since 1994 South Africa has aggressively sought to expand its export 
markets to generate the much needed foreign exchange to fund its economic growth. In this 
endeavour, liberalization has underpinned much of SA’s international trade activities with vast 
reforms being carried out in tariff regimes to facilitate the flow of capital across its borders. 
According to Vickers (2014) South Africa has one of the most liberal laws for FDI and 
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prioritises investor confidence. Cassim and Seventer (2004: 2) point out that tariff 
liberalisation, exchange rate and trade related export measures are the most important policy 
tools that have an enormous impact on trade. 
SA has taken steps to reform its tariff regime in order to promote investment and trade through 
signing a number of trade agreements. In 2008 SA signed the SADC Free Trade Area (SADC-
FTA) in an effort to promote regional integration and increase the volume of regional trade. 
SA is also part of the SACU-EU FTA while also participating in the Generalised System of 
Preferences and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Vickers, 2014). The 
government in 1993 signed the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement under which it 
made an undertaking to progressively reduce its tariffs on imports. According to the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2010) South Africa’s tariff declined from an average 
of 23% in the 1990s to just 8% in 2010. Cassim and Seventer (2004) point out the sustained 
tariff reduction in manufacturing, the elimination of surcharges and quantitative control in 
agriculture and the phased reduction of tariff charges surpassing multilateral tariff reform as 
the most important steps government took to liberalise trade in post-apartheid. 
Figure 12: South Africa exchange rates over the years 
 
Source: Hlahla, N. 2014. South African economy: Overview of key trends since 1994, 
Industrial Development Corporation, Available at http://c.ymcdn.com 
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Figure 12 above shows how South Africa made efforts to devalue its currency in order to 
expand its export base. The rand was over-valued when the new democratic government took 
office in 1994. The nominal and effective exchange rates were reviewed downwards in the first 
eight years of post-apartheid from by 3% and 7% respectively. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to establish the effect or the impact of the TDCA on the South African and 
the European Union trade relationship within the context of realism and the World systems 
theory core-semi periphery- periphery framework. The TDCA is a broad-based free trade 
agreement between the two parties under which each of the parties undertook to liberalise trade 
on broad and comprehensive spectrum of products. This, it was argued, would expand trade 
and create a mutually beneficial economic relationship between the EU and SA. However, 
statistics paint a sobering picture for the South African economy as the EU is overwhelmingly 
dominating trade between the two parties. South Africa enjoys modest trade surpluses in the 
agricultural and mining sectors which are dominated by raw unprocessed products. This surplus 
is amply offset by the enormous deficit that the statistics show in the manufacturing sector. 
South Africa suffers a deficit of over 1000% in some cases in terms of trade in the 
manufacturing products. As such the South African manufacturing sector seems to have been 
handed a raw deal in the TDCA as it evidently cannot cope with the competition unleashed by 
the tariff liberalisation measures under the TDCA. Based on the analysis of the available 
statistics, it is safe to conclude that the TDCA reinforces and reproduces the core-periphery 
trade patterns between the developed and the developing countries. The latter play their role as 
the suppliers of raw unprocessed products of lower value in the world market while the former 
are established as suppliers of processed products of higher value thus leaving a gap in equality 
within the relationship thus established. The available data also paints the glaring picture of 
interest and power play as a motivate for the relationship established as a result of the TDCA. 
The next chapter will therefore analyse the implication of TDCA on SADC in terms of the 
rationale that has informed South Africa’s integration policies and approach in post-apartheid 





TDCA Implications on SADC 
4.1. Introduction 
To this end, it has been argued that the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement entered 
into between SA and EU is vast and wide-ranging. Under this agreement, the two parties are 
implementing trade liberalization on a long list of trade items that is likely to affect South 
Africa’s trade patterns and dynamics in no small ways. The trade deal will naturally have far-
reaching implications for the SADC region especially as South Africa is the largest economy 
in the region. South Africa accounts for 70% of the region’s collective GDP and controls 60% 
of intra-regional trade. In this light, South Africa has firmly established itself as the epicenter 
of economic and trade flow in Southern Africa. Bearing in mind the theoretical framework of 
realism and the world systems theory to which this study is underpinned, this chapter analyses 
the impact and implications of the TDCA on the progress of regional economic integration in 
the SADC region in terms of economic and trade development. The first section will analyze 
the factors and forces informing South Africa’s policy and approach to regional integration 
since 1994. The second section will take stock of the extent of South Africa’s role in the intra-
regional trade in the SADC region in terms of its exports and imports. This will create a strong 
background for the analysis of the implications of the TDCA on South Africa’s relations with 
SADC. 
4.2. South Africa’s Policy on Regional Integration 
The post-apartheid government at its inception in 1994 immediately recognised the importance 
of regional economic relations as an important element of its broader approach to global 
economic relations. Departing from the apartheid government’s policy of pursuing domination 
and economic hegemony in Southern Africa, the new government sought cooperation. Since 
1994 the government has repeatedly committed itself to promoting regional cooperation along 
new lines that will correct imbalances in current relationships. This policy stance was adopted 
on the realisation that strong and stable regional economic and political environment was 
essential to South Africa’s consolidation of its democracy, security and political stability. 
Moreover, enhancing regional integration had considerable economic benefits in terms of 
expanding and growing the export market, becoming more competitive in the global economic 
environment and also achieving economies of scale.  Vickers (2014: 57) argues that there was 
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a shift from neo-liberal approach to regional integration to developmental regionalism whose 
main principles were market integration, economic restructuring and development of 
infrastructure. As such, South Africa viewed SADC as an important partner in its quest to grow 
its own economy and expand its participation in the global economy. 
The South African Customs Union (SACU) (which comprises of South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) and the SADC have been the main platforms which South 
Africa has used to promote its quest for regional integration. The post-apartheid government 
led the move to change and recalibrate the terms of the SACU agreement to make it a more 
effective player in the 21st century circumstances. South Africa also actively participated in the 
negotiations of the 2000 SADC Trade Protocol which aimed at reducing the barriers to trade 
in the region and creating more dynamic and sustainable economy. South Africa’s role and 
policy in these two institutions will be discussed below. 
 
4.3. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
SACU was an international body established between South Africa in 1910 and the British 
High Commission territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. The organization 
was however, modernized in 1969 in order to establish a customs-free zone among the member 
parties with a common external tariff in a bid to foster regional integration and promote 
economic growth (Grant, 2006). The terms and agreement of SACU were as follows: 
a) The maintenance of similar tariff to that which exists in the Union of South Africa 
b) The equitable share of the duties on goods passing through the South Africa to the 
territories shall be paid over them, and vice versa. 
c) The free interchange of South African products and manufacturers between member 
nations and territories. (http://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=564) 
The apartheid government had used the organization as an instrument of expanding its 
economic and political influence and therefore consolidating its hegemony. It was very obvious 
that at the established SACU, South Africa had the most to gain as the country with the greater 
comparative advantage in terms of development and economy in the region by having similar 
tariffs and the interchange of products their products with other SACU members. South Africa 
adopted import substitution policies which guaranteed a regional market and made SA the sole 
administrator of SACU revenue pool. This was possible because South Africa was pivotal in 
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setting the SACU import duties and excise policies (http://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394).  
The SACU agreement in 1969 included the following: 
a) A Common External Tariff on all goods imported into the Union from the rest of the 
world; a common pool of customs duties as per the total volume of external trade; and 
excise duties based on the total production and consumption of excisable goods 
b) Free movement of SACU manufactured products within SACU, without any duties or 
quantitative restrictions 
c) A Revenue-Sharing Formula for the distribution of customs and excise revenues 
collected by the Union (http://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394). 
There were two major changes to the agreement in 1965 when Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland 
and South Africa become sovereign states these were: 
a) The addition of excise duties into the revenue pool; and 
b) The annual increase of BLS revenue by 42%. (http://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394). 
Regardless of these changes South Africa still had a lot of influence and sole decision making 
over the customs and excise polices. Manufacturers from South African benefitted from trade 
diverting effects of having open access to the market from the BLS states as well as high 
common tariff barriers for Southern African neighbours exports to SACU 
(http://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394). The absence of a joint decision making resulted in the 
BLS requesting a factored compensation from the revenue sharing formula, so as to address 
the loss of fiscal discretion. They were three key issues that concerned the BLS: 
a) There was no joint decision making- SACU was only administered on a part time basis by 
annual meetings of the Customs Union Commission as a result they were no effective 
procedures to ensure compliance or resolve disputes 
b) The Revenue Sharing Formula- the Revenue Sharing Formula determined each country’s 
share. In 1976 they amended it to include a stabilization factor that ensured BLS received at 
least 17 percent, and at most 23 percent of the value of excise duties 
c) Question of external (outside SACU) trade- the BLS argued that SA consistently entered 




When the new South African government came into office it initiated negotiations for the 
reform of the organization which culminated into the new agreement in 2002 defining the new 
terms of engagement. The new pact had several significant clauses that highlighted a new 
approach to regional integration: 
a) The establishment of common institutions like the SACU Tariff Board to promulgate 
and manage trade policy 
b) The creation of the SACU Tribunal to resolve and settle disputes between countries 
c) Formulate a revenue sharing formula (RSF) to administer the shares of customs revenue 
and excise taxes to ensure fairness and equitability 
d) Strengthening and deepening integration through developing common policies in areas 
spanning agriculture, industry and competition (Grant, 2006). 
The terms of the new agreement put SACU on a new trajectory of regional integration and 
cooperation. With this new agreement, SACU can effectively play as the nucleus and basis of 
wider regional integration across the whole SADC region.  SACU can also play an instrumental 
role in South Africa’s quest to bring new investment in the Southern African region while 
adapting to the new dynamics in the global economy. 
Table 3: South Africa’s dominance in intra-SACU trade (Million Rand) 




Botswana - 14 1805 5070 7 6896 87.9 
Lesotho 74 - 7 2301 94 2476 98.5 
Namibia 4814 7 - 6649 9 11479 88.4 
SA 43,868 13620 45367 - 13999 116854 - 
Swaziland 35 53 170 11244 - 11502 98.6 
Total 
imports 
48791 13694 47349 25264 14109 149207 95.2 
 
Source: SACU Merchandise Trade Statistics 2013, available at http://www.sacu.int. 
Table 3 above gives the details of intra-SACU trade in terms of exports and imports and shows 
overwhelming evidence of South Africa’s dominance of the customs union. Out of 149-billion-
rand worth of exports in trade among SACU countries, South Africa lays claim 116 billion 
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Rands. South Africa is also the major trade partner of every SACU member state claiming an 
average share of over 90%. Furthermore, SA accounted for 98.6% of Swaziland intra-SACU 
imports, which was the highest in the Union, and it also accounted for 98.5% of Lesotho intra-
SACU trade. This also includes 88.4% of Namibia’s and 87.9% of Botswana’s intra SACU 
trade. This shows that there is overdependence on South Africa and the fact that countries 
import from South Africa way more than they export to it is testament to an acute trade 
imbalance (http://www.sacu.int/docs/reports/2014/SACU-Merchandise-Trade-Statistics-
2013.pdf). 
What is also clear is that much of the SACU countries’ international trade revolves around 
South Africa. The monetary policy within SACU is largely led by SA. Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and SA all form a Common Monetary Area, within which the Lesotho currency, the 
Namibian dollar and the Swazi currency are pegged to the South African Rand. Countries 
within SADC depend of South Africa for their trading and investment, South Africa allows 
countries like Botswana and Swaziland to franchise their clothing stores or food stores, for 
example Botswana has franchised stores like Mr Price, Woolworths and KFC. South Africa 
dominates in relation to imports and exports and the TDCA has given them an added advantage. 
This is as a result of the flow of infrastructural goods into the South Africa economy, hereby 
impacting positively on the growth of the economy comparatively to its regional counterparts. 
The TDCA also makes South Africa an intermediary of trade flow (import and export) between 
EU and SACU and by extension, SADC member states.  Even though Botswana is not a 
member of the Common Monetary Area, its currency is influenced to a larger extend by the 
fluctuation in the rand (Odhiambo, 2015; Lesotho et al, 2016). The BLNS countries to a large 
extent follow South Africa’s monetary and exchange policies (WTO, 2003; Basdevant et al, 
2015; Benjamin, 2016). 
Therefore, it is the hypothesis of this study that the TDCA deal between South Africa and the 
EU is likely to have a significant bearing on SACU and by extension SADC member states. 
This bearing and impact has the potential for SACU member states to link their production 
mechanisms in agriculture, industry, manufacturing and services, hereby, promoting the speedy 





4.4. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 with the aim 
of limiting the economic impact of South Africa on its neighbors. The organization was a result 
of the efforts to create a solidarity against apartheid South Africa. This solidarity was 
consolidated with the signing of the 5th October, 1993 treaty which was ratified by 10 countries 
from Southern Africa who were committed to the formation of the new regional economic and 
political bloc. The regional economic agenda in SADC is to facilitate market integration with 
policy coordination and sectoral cooperation in a broad development project. The SADC 
Protocol on Trade was amended in August of 2008; the vision was to establish a FTA within 
the SADC region.  The major agenda of the union was to enhance international trade 
liberalization in order to ensure efficiency in production, economic development, 
diversification as well as create a climate which will allow for cross border foreign and 
domestic investment. SAndrey (2013) observed that about 85% of intra- regional trade within 




















Table 4: The aggregate global trade data for SADC in 2011, $million &% shares 
 
Source: WTO data at www.wto.org/statitics cited by (Sandrey and Fundira, 2007) 
Table.4 shows the total exports from SADC during 2011, these were reported as being worth 
$209.7 billion. 46.2% of the total exports are from South Africa and 31.2% from Angola (a 
combined 77.4%). The total imports were reported as being $207.2 billion with 58.7% imported 
into South Africa and 10.6% into Angola (a combined 69. 3%).By destination it is clear to see 
that South Africa dominates, with limited bilateral intraregional SADC export trade and even 
more limited bilateral intraregional SADC imports. It is also evident that what happens with 
South African and to a lesser extent Angolan trade will largely determine the outcome of the 







Table 5: South African export data as reported by the Global Trade Atlas, 2007 to 2012, 
$ million 
 All Exports Annual Series: 2007-2012 
 Partner US dollars, millions 




 World 69.868 80.208 62.380 81.311  96.702 87.264 
 Africa 8.999 11.528 10.232 11.735  13.811 14.494 
 BRIC 5.997 7.566 8.478 12.201  16.221 15.005 
 EU 21.061 23.653 15.025 19.197  21.333 17.838 
 Africa 9.641 12.537 10.827 12.617  14.916 15.722 
 SACU 0 0 0 0 4.943 0 261 





8.21% 9.49% 10.77% 9.91%  9.89% 11.90% 
Source: Global Trade Atlas (South African Revenue Services data) 
In table 5, the ITC and official South African data shows a significant difference. The ITC 
indicate an exports of about 16, 0404 million dollars to SADC, while the GTA shows about 
8.060 million dollars. The 79% difference is primarily due the exports to Botswana and 
Zimbabwe, with a contribution that are not in the GTA data from the GTA exports to Lesotho 
and differences for both Tanzania and Malawi. It is important to note despite a lowering of 
tariffs or SADC imports over this period, its overall share of import seems to have experience 
a slight change. Between 2007 and 2008, it had above 5%. It however declines to less than 
4.5% in 2009 to 2011, and experience a recovery to 5.57% in 2012 (Saundrey 2013: 13-14). 
South Africa is the biggest player in the exports controlling a commanding 68% of the exports 
(Sandrey, 2013). This shows that SADC is crucial to South Africa’s international economic 
policy as it provides a considerable export market size. South Africa is also the third highest 
importer within SADC with 14.8% coming after Botswana and Zimbabwe with 17 and 23% 
respectively (Sandrey, 2013). As such, it is in the interest of South Africa to actively participate 
in shaping SADC policy to meet its economic and political objectives. 
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The free trade negotiations which culminated in the SADC Trade Protocol were finalized in 
2000 at which time the tariff came into effect. There was some progress in this region which 
resulted in the elimination of duty on 85% of traded goods in 2008. The SADC was improved 
further in 2012 when 92% of the goods were traded duty free mainly to South Africa and fellow 
SACU members’ initiative. Despite this notable achievement, considerable work remains to 
consolidate the FTA. Some of the SADC members (Angola and DRC) are yet to join the FTA 
while some member states constantly breach the provisions of the Trade Protocol by reinstating 
tariffs on some goods. 
SADC, due mainly to geography and proximity is by large South Africa’s most crucial trading 
region in Africa. The SADC region plays an important part in the stability of the South African 
economy. It serves as the market destination for South Africa’s noncompetitive commodities 
at the international arena. Due to its strategic importance, the first post-apartheid foreign policy 
document was geared towards creating a framework for cooperation within the Southern 
African region. Amos (2010:126) observed that the vision of the region is to create the highest 
possible regional economic integration and mutual assistance as well as joint developmental 
initiatives which will lead to socio-economic and political integration.  SADC supplied 6% of 
South Africa’s imports from the world compared to COMESA and the East African 
Community (EAC)’s 1%. SADC imports were US$6 billion whilst COMESA and the EAC 
imports amounted to US$1 billion each Moreover, in terms of South Africa’s exports SADC is 
also the dominant partner. In 2012 SADC received 10% of South Africa’s exports to the world 
valued at $10 billion. In comparison COMESA received $9 billion worth of South African 
exports while the EAC received $2 billion exports. Intra-regional trade is diversifying albeit at 
a slow pace. 
The SADC region still faces important challenges that continue to hinder progress towards a 
fully-fledged and economically viable customs union. One of the issues of concern is the lack 
of capacity by SADC member states to fully utilise improved market access in South Africa 
due to mainly infrastructural constraints. While South African imports from the region are 
increasing, it is the quality of the growth that is the cause for concern as it is mostly unprocessed 
and low value commodities drive most of the growth. Against this background, it goes without 
saying that the TDCA deal between South Africa and the EU is likely to affect trade dynamics 
and patterns between South Africa and the SADC. The extent and direction of the impact of 
this deal is what the next section will attempt to appraise. 
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4.5. The TDCA, SACU, SADC- Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): The 
Issues 
South Africa signed the TDCA deal with the European Union without involving fellow 
members of the SACU or of the SADC. However, it was inevitable that BLNS group which 
belongs to the SACU was going to be affected. The most important issue was how the existing 
tariff policy of the SACU organisation was going to accommodate the tariff arrangements 
reached under the TDCA between South Africa and the EU. 
Although there were concerns from SACU about the TDCA agreement between SA and EU, 
it is important to analyse how the TDCA affected the SADC EPA negotiations with the EU in 
2004.This was part of an effort to replace the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 between the 
EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries whose terms did not meet the 
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Hurt, 2012). The 
negotiations have revealed serious challenges towards regional integration. Firstly, there have 
been divisions and differences between the SADC countries up to the point of negotiating the 
EPAs in clusters. For example, seven SADC countries which include the BLNS group, Angola, 
Mozambique and the DRC signed an EPA with the EU. While other SADC countries 
Mauritius, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe chose to join the East African Community group. 
Such moves have derailed efforts at creating a single and harmonised trade regime between the 
EU and the SADC region since countries entered into different arrangements with the EU. This 
exposes serious divisions and disunity that will hamper South Africa’s efforts to bring the 
TDCA in line with the region’s objectives so that it becomes a mutually beneficial venture. 
Moreover, as the EU is probably the region’s most important trading partner, the outcome of 
the EPA negotiations makes it difficult for the region to formulate a uniform and coherent trade 
policy that will improve the economy of the region. 
Moreover, one other challenge that has to be taken into consideration when analysing the 
impact of the TDCA on SADC regional integration is the poor appraisal of the nature of the 
factors holding sway. It is important to recognise that the TDCA is centred mostly on trade 
liberalisation in the form of reducing or eliminating tariffs. While tariffs constitute an essential 
component of international trade, the intra-SADC trade flow is hampered mostly by non-tariff 
barriers. Vickers (2014) points out that non-tariff barriers such as underdeveloped production 
structures, disparity in development levels, inadequate and dilapidated infrastructure and 
severe capacity constraints are likely to limit trade flow in the region. As such, it is difficult to 
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gauge the impact of the TDCA on the SADC region if the complex nature of the challenges 
that threaten regional integration is not taken into account. 
4.6. The Impact of TDCA on SADC 
4.6.1. Derailment of Regional Integration 
One of the main aims underlying the EU and SADC’s engagement was to promote and 
reinforce regionalism and regional integration. The EU being Southern Africa’s largest trade 
partner, it was assumed that it would be easy for the SADC member states to forge a common 
policy in dealing with EU and thus create new opportunities and avenues for further 
cooperation. However, contrary to the initial assumptions, the attempt by the EU to strike a 
trade deal with the SADC has exposed and to some extent reinforced divisions and differences 
between the SADC states. The SADC member states were divided on how to approach the EU 
deal as a collective and apparently failed to find common ground leading to the split and 
continuing the negotiations in separate groups. The rationale for the failure to establish a 
common ground for cooperation among SADC members cannot be farfetched from the drive 
as each country within SADC strive to pursue its strategic nation interest at the expense of the 
other members involve in the deal agreement.  
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mauritius, DRC and Madagascar decided to negotiate an EPA 
separately with the COMESA group. The SACU countries were joined by Mozambique, 
Angola and Tanzania in negotiating a separate EPA with the EU.  The cause of the disunity 
between the SADC countries with regard to the EU EPA is widely suspected to be the terms of 
the TDCA. There was disagreement amongst the countries on which products to exclude or 
include in the liberalization schedule and on the appropriate time frame. For instance, countries 
in the SADC have different abilities and resources to process raw materials from mining and 
agriculture. Thus given the varied economic structures a blanket deal with the EU would have 
possibly meant that some countries were going to lose while others gain. Moreover, the TDCA 
was negotiated between South Africa and the EU with South Africa influencing the contents 
and terms of the deal to suit its specific and strategic national interests thus furthering the realist 
and core-periphery-periphery argument. In conclusion, the TDCA needed to have been 
negotiated together with the SACU countries. This is because even though they are not directly 
involved they are largely affected by the agreement. 
The failure of the SADC countries to sustain a unified stance might have far-reaching and 
negative implications for intra-SADC trade flow. For example, the application of the Rules of 
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Origin might hamper the smooth flow of trade between the countries in the region. The different 
agreements the two groups may have entered into with the EU are likely to result in states 
imposing tariffs and duties on goods imported from neighboring countries based on the rules 
of origin. 
4.6.2. Perpetuating Peripheral Status: Locating Power Within the TDCA 
Partridge (1963: 235) defines power as ‘the ability to do something by an actor which affects 
another actor, and which leads to changes in the future patterns of events. This can be seen 
mostly within the decision making process’. Within the TDCA between the EU and SADC, 
power constructs persist. Firstly, the EU region is 50 times developed with an outstanding 
capacity to enter deals with any individual SADC member states. In such dealings, due to 
power, it is the EU’s terms of trade that are favoured at the expense of the SADC member 
states. Therefore, to its economic power and comparative advantage the EU has the capacity to 
force any individual SADC member states who disagree with its trading terms into submission. 
For instance, the SADC member states are still divided on how to approach the EU deal as a 
collective. Apparently despite it being a common trading block, individual states within SADC 
have failed to find common ground. This is leading to the splits and continuing private 
negotiations in separate groups. 
Secondly, South Africa has a more advanced infrastructural and economically developed 
trading system. South Africa has well developed primary and tertiary sectors which include 
mining, agriculture as well as wholesale and retail trade, tourism and communications. In 
addition, the country has modern transport networks that link the country to other African 
countries. As such, it has a better comparative advantage when compared to countries such as 
Swaziland and Lesotho. Due to the foregoing facts, any trade deal between the EU and South 
Africa deal will naturally have far-reaching implications for the SADC region. For instance, 
South Africa is the largest economy in the region. South Africa accounts for 70% of the 
region’s collective GDP and controls 60% of intra-regional trade. In this light, due to power 
that South Africa has- the epicentre of economic and trade flow in Southern Africa- South 
Africa is able to force other individual SADC countries into submission in entering into any 
bilateral trade. 
The research problem of this study was to find out whether the EU-SA trade agreement promote 
or retard integration within SADC region and the implications it has on SADC. However, 
looking at the preceding sub-sections in this chapter, firstly, the TDCA, it must be 
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acknowledged, is an asymmetrical deal between economically unequal partners. Due to 
inequality, as realists aver, the prime concern of the state in international relation is survival. 
To this effect – the state can use any means possible to retain survival. It can thus sell divisive 
or cooperative ideas to achieve its ends. This realist view is well exhibited in the TDCA 
between EU and SADC. The continuing disagreement among SADC countries on which 
products to exclude or include in the liberalization schedule and on the appropriate time frame, 
illustrates this view better. For all the countries in the EU and SADC regions have different 
comparative advantages and exhibit different levels of sensitivity to different products. Thus, 
each country due to any power it has-from the comparative advantage will strive to sell divisive 
terms of trade to achieve its ends (survival). 
Secondly, The European Union has a well-developed and industrialized economy whose size 
is over 50 times larger than that of the SADC. In answering the research question as to how the 
EU-South Africa trade agreement affect the promotion of regional integration within SADC, 
due to a well-developed economy, liberalization and free trade agreement between the EU and 
South Africa is likely to affect trade within the SADC region. The EU with its modernized and 
technology driven economy is likely to reinforce the SADC countries’ status as belonging to 
the periphery in terms of the global economy. The SADC countries are mostly underdeveloped. 
Other than favouring unified SADC trade agreements, the underdeveloped SADC member 
states will prefer individual trade agreements with the EU (disintegration of SADC). The 
separate deal that Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mauritius, DRC and Madagascar decided to 
negotiated with EPA and the COMESA group is clear enough to show that the TDCA between 
SA and EU is disintegrating the SADC. Another example of SADC disintegration is when 
Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania negotiated a separate EPA with the EU. 
4.7. The EU-SA TDCA and its Impacts on SADC: An Analysis 
In the literature review, this study established that most studies done on this issue are one 
dimensional. For instance, Lewis, Robinson and Thierfedler (2000), Akinkugbe (2000), Gibb 
(2003) look at the advantages in engaging in free trade and how it generates economic growth 
and increases the exports for both developing and developed countries. In another study Lee 
(2010), Rodrik (2001), Jachia and Teljeur (1999) examines the harmful impacts of free trade 
for developing countries like South Africa because it forces them to lower their export prices 
and lead to an income transfer from poor countries to richer countries. Lastly there are scholars 
like Holland (1995), Akinkugbe (2000) and Lewis, Robinson and Thierfelder (2003) who 
analysed the trade agreement between the EU and SA and briefly analyse the impact this 
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agreement would have on SADC. Many of these studies have focused on how EU-SA TDCA 
is beneficial in improving SA’s economy and international trade. However, these studies pay a 
blind eye on the impacts of the EU-SA TDCA on regional integration within the SADC region. 
For example, Industrial Development Corporation (2013: 16) emphasizes how the volume of 
SA’s foreign trade has increased in leaps and bounds, growing from less than 400 billion Rand 
in 1994 to 1.6 trillion Rands in 2012 after signing the SA-EU TDCA.  Similarly, Mare (2013) 
found out that 77 percent of foreign direct investment in SA comes from the EU and that this 
trade has grown by 128 percent due to the TDCA. However, through the tenets of regional 
integration and comparative advantages perspectives, such studies have failed to give verifiable 
data on how the TDCA between EU and -SA has far-reaching implications for SADC 
integration. 
This study is of the view that if comparative advantage is considered trading with countries 
within SADC who have larger economies and produce a larger quantity of goods both for 
export and domestic use is recommendable (Khumalo et al, 2013). In analysing the SA-EU 
TDCA, one has to take into consideration that each economically powerful SADC member will 
consider its market production in entering any TDCA. Due to this fact, there is likelihood of 
SADC disintegrating in quest for market competition with the EU. For instance, it is due to the 
strength of the South African economy that was a major factor that attracted the EU into TDCA 
with SA. As shown in chapter three, South Africa is an economic powerhouse in Africa with a 
GDP of over US$349 billion in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). This gives South Africa comparative 
advantage over other SADC member states. Therefore, due to this advantage, a South Africa 
will want an integrated SADC that will be in its favour. This may become a root cause of 
regional dis/integration. In one way, other SADC member states will enter SA-EU SADC trade 
deals due to South Africa’s advantageous positioning. In another way, some SADC member 
will not want to be associated with SA-EU in an attempt to protect their market and special 
products. 
There is also some economic impact of SA-EU TDCA. The SA-EU TDCA has enhanced 
regional co-operation from intra-SADC liberalization. For instance, as it was indicated in 
Chapter Three, the EU-SA TDCA is resulting in the expansions of SADC economies especially 
through the trade by the parties involved in the animal, agriculture and processed food sectors. 
This does not rule out the fact the TDCA is making the SADC manufacturing sector to be 
comparatively less attractive following liberalization. From the preceding view, this study 
argues that the SA-EU TDCA has made the EU the biggest trading partner for many SADC 
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economies. However, it is crucial to seek further integration within SADC at the same time in 
order to reap these benefits of this TDCA.  Despite the presumed gains that the EU-SA TDCA 
has on SADC economies, there is the possibility of the EU signing other TDCAs with 
individual SADC member states or the region as a whole. This will lower expected gains for 
SADC economies, making the EU-SA TDCA less appealing. On revenue sharing (among 
SACU members), the less appealing SADC-EU TDCA will require that adjustments be made 
so that there is a net transfer of resources to lesser developed SADC members. This is disastrous 
to regional integration. 
With soaring trade between South Africa and countries such as Japan and China which SA 
does not have any formal trade agreement with, there is evidence that the EU-SA TDCA may 
suffer a blow (Kwentua, 2006). It would be too early to assess the actual trade effects of the 
EU-SA TDCA on SADC. This is because other SADC member states are trading with countries 
like China and Japan and among themselves. Some of these trade flows among SADC countries 
are usually not reported. Similarly, comparatively, most SADC countries are more dependent 
than the EU on trade.  For example, Botswana exports accounts for about 58% of its GDP, 
while export accounts for about 52% of GDP for the rest of SADC. Contrarily, to the EU 
exports of 14% of its GDP. The same pattern holds for imports between SADC and the EU. 
However, South Africa is more like the EU in its trading pattern. Therefore, since there is a 
high trade dependency for other SADC members apart from South Africa, it means SA-EU 
TDCA liberalization can lead to large structural changes in South Africa and indeed for 
Southern Africa. Based on this structural changes some SADC economies may be hurt by the 
SA-EU TDCA some may benefit slightly (Andrianmananjara, Soamiely and Russell, 2001). 
 
While EU liberation of trade with South Africa seeks to promote SADC-EU TDCA, Hurst 
(2012) argues that this is a way of promoting ‘open regionalism’. For Hurst (2012), such a 
stand poses threats to the coherence of SADC.  For instance, in 2006, when the EU had sought 
to modify its EPA negotiations with the rest of SADC member states, it included South Africa 
as a key negotiator. South Africa for its part claims that it joined the EPA negotiations in order 
to prevent the further break-up of the SADC region as a whole. Therefore, during this 
negotiation, the inclusion of South Africa (which had its SA-EU TDCA) was seen by other 
SADC member states as a compromise to the coherence of SADC as an organisation. This non-
coherence of SADC became clear when other (most) member states of SADC began to be 
involved in other regional EPA negotiations. The focus now has shifted from SADC to SACU. 
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Another impact of the EU-SA TDCA on SADC is the unfair trade policy generated by the 
agreement. As it has been discussed in the precious sections, the EU and South Africa are more 
developed economies than the rest of the SADC member states. Just as it was during the 
negotiations for the EU—SA FTA, South African workers protested against the negative 
impact EU exports on the South African economy. The workers protested against an attempt 
by the EU to maintain high duties on South African imports while heavily subsidized European 
products flooded South African markets. This was a threat to job security in South Africa (Luke 
1998). The SADC faces the same threat in two ways. Firstly, the unfair trade policy from the 
EU on the developing SADC member states. Secondly, the flooding of heavily subsidized 
South Africa and EU products in all SADC member states (Lee, 2002). This therefore, 
constitute a threat to the development of production industries in other SADC member states.  
While the SA-EU TDCA has many positive impacts on the SADC region, however, this study 
argues that the foregoing TDCA puts both EU and South Africa in advantageous position in 
comparison to the rest of SADC member states who are placed in a positive of comparative 
disadvantage vis a vis the position of core – semi periphery- periphery structural arrangement. 
As such this constitute a lingering threat to SADC integration. In many of its arguments, this 
study may have subordinated the real importance of the EU-SA TDCA. However, with the 
emergence of China, this study maintains that there is a need to re-think the SA-EU-SADC 
trade agreement. Although it is through trade agreement that SADC is fostering its unity, the 
impacts of SA-EU TDCA are one dimensional: unfair trade with developing SADC members. 
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter critically discussed the impact of SA-EU TDCA on SADC regional integration. 
Through the tenets of realism and the world systems theories, the chapter argued that South 
Africa and EU are well positioned to reap more benefits in the TDCA than the other SADC 
members. The study established that the SA-EU-SADC TDCA is an asymmetrical deal 
between economically unequal partners. This chapter showed how the pursuit of individual 
country interests sow divisions within SADC. Against the preference of the asymmetrical 
unequal partners that the SA-EU-SADC TDCA upholds, the chapter recommends that the 
continuing attempts by the EU to strike a trade deal with the SADC is deemed to expose and 
reinforce more divisions and differences between the SADC states. Hence, while the SA-EU 
TDCA has many positive impacts on the SADC region, it furthers the core – semi periphery- 
periphery structural arrangement and reinforce the realist notion of state pursuance of national 
interest in international relation. This hereby constitute a threat to regional integration within 
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the SADC region. Based on the foregoing, the next chapter attempts an analysis of the possible 
economic implication of Brexit on EU and by extension, the South African economy vis a vis 





IMPACT OF BRITAINS EXIT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
5.1. Introduction 
The current chapter discusses the recent vote by Britain to exit the European Union and the 
likely impact this exit will have on South Africa. Using realism as a theoretical framework, this 
chapter provides a brief background to Britain’s exit from the EU. The argument here is that 
Britain’s exist of the EU was carried out of the rationale of protecting British strategic interest 
in the global arena in terms of economy and power politics as argued by realism. This chapter 
also discusses the role of Britain in the EU and the trade relations that exist between SA and 
Britain. At the core of this chapter is the aim to understand the possible implications of such a 
move to South Africa’s economy. 
5.2. Causes of Britain’s Exit (BREXIT) 
The referendum on Britain to exit the EU is likely to have profound implications for its 
economy, international influence, social cohesion and political culture. The recent vote for 
Britain to exit the EU has caused a number of socio-economic and political uncertainties 
(Matthijs, 2013). There are a number of factors that have been implicated on British exit of the 
EU. People campaigning for Britain to leave the European Union argue that Britain has no need 
for membership of the European Union when it has the Commonwealth (Lazowski, 2012). For 
Lazowski, the EU is an organisation alien both politically and culturally from the UK. The 
Commonwealth has 53 independent states formerly part of the British Empire. These states 
offer UK a vast, untapped network built around a shared political system and heritage 
(Lazowski, 2012). With this in mind one can conclude that those advocating for the British exit 
envisage a new ready-made global role outside the EU. The clamour for Britain’s exist from 
the foregoing is hinged on the need to advance its national interest by exploring its advantage 
as leader of the commonwealth.    
Another reason for the exit has been its scepticism on the state of Europe. Britain has over the 
years been doubtful of Europe. The British people have been Eurosceptic and have thus 
questioned the instrumental benefits of membership. EU’s free trade provisions are said to 
bring material advantages. However, over the past decades EU’s role and activities have 
increasingly lost popularity (Łazowski, 2012). Some economic analysts have seen the EU as a 
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dictatorship with a leadership that is not clear on how it is selected and thus not accountable 
and transparent (Matthijs, 2013). According to (Matthews, 2015) the appointment of EU 
members is barely known as they are appointed and not elected. The majority of citizens in the 
European Union do not even know who the leadership is and as such the public cannot initiate 
or repeal legislation. Thus the British saw that there was no democratic way of repealing the 
laws and legislation. The EU leadership is seen as power without accountability. The UK thus 
saw independence as a possible opportunity for self-governance and growth. 
Governments in the Commonwealth have expressed interest for Britain to take a stronger role 
in the Commonwealth organisation, developing its political and economic integration. The 
Commonwealth members benefitted from the UK's membership of the EU and are also likely 
to be affected by “Brexit”. Furthermore, bilateral trading relations between individual 
Commonwealth countries and the UK could change after “Brexit”. The exit is likely to make 
common wealth a free trade area which can either complement or rival the EU (Murray & 
Broomfield, 2014). It can be concluded that the Commonwealth offers Britain a vast network 
in which to expand and deepen its economic, political and cultural engagement. 
Instead of promoting regional trade the EU has engaged in protectionism (Łazowski, 2012). 
This can be seen by the vast number of trade barriers such as Tariffs, Quotas and regulations. 
Quotas limit the number of imports into a country which is designed to protect local companies. 
However, such a move has resulted in the protection of inefficient producers and drag down 
efficient ones (Łazowski, 2012). This largely affects negatively on the consumers who have to 
buy expensive goods with low quality. Reduced competition does not do the protected 
companies any favour as they will see no need to be creative and thus improve. This has 
resulted in the EU becoming a declining trade block. In addition to the above, lobby groups 
and analysts in Britain have noted that many of the EU regulations impose a cost on business 
that’s not always matched by tangible benefits (Łazowski, 2012). The regulations of the EU 
have actually been an expense to the British economy. It was thus not in their economic interest 
to remain in the EU. 
5.3. Role of Britain in the EU 
Britain has a strong economy with lucrative trade engagements with the rest of the world. It is 
among the dominant countries that have assumed leadership roles in Europe Union trade. 
Britain and Germany have been the significant net contributors to the EU budget. Britain alone 
contributes over 10 % of the budget. Britain has enjoyed economic benefits from being part of 
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the EU. 44.6% of UK exports of goods and services as well as 53.2% of its imports are with 
EU member states. In addition, UK- EU trade has been largely dominated by goods rather than 
services. This trade represented an estimate of two-thirds UK exports to the EU, and over three-
quarters of UK imports from EU.  in 1973, Britain join the EU, and brought with her to the 
negotiation table, her former colonies in order for them to benefit from aid agreements in which 
former French colonies were already benefiting from (Matthews, 2015). This arrangement 
became known as the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP). This allows for the 
negotiation of African aids and trade. Prior to joining the ACP in 1975, Africa’s export to the 
EU was about 6% of EU imports. However, as at 2000, Africa’s export has reduced to only 1% 
of EU imports. While the EU awarded large sum of aids to Africa, it aids policies came with 
prohibitive trade practices which deter Africa’s growth and development (Matthews, 2015). 
Britain remains a key player in the global economy as it has traditionally served as the European 
financial services capital and as a gateway to the EU. 
5.4. History of Trade between South Africa and Britain 
South Africa and Britain have shared common interests in a number of areas. The UK accounts 
for about 15% of South Africa’s trade with the European Union. This accounts for about 3.7% 
of South Africa’s global trade. Although SA has about but 20% of exports to the EU, the 
majority have been to the UK (Gibb, 2016; IDC, 2016). The UK represents about 18% of all 
tourists visiting South Africa and this might change in the present future (SA Tourism 
2010,2013; IDC, 2016). The UK buys 10% of South Africa’s exported wine, 10% of exported 
citrus fruit and 21% of exported grapes (DAFF, 2010; 2011; 2015; IDC, 2016).Trade is a big 
part of the UK-SA relationship (Edwards and Lawrence, 2012) South Africa's largest exports 
to the United Kingdom are gems and precious metals (Łazowski, 2012). Thus the British Exit 
is likely going to hamper the levels of trade between UK-based companies and South Africa as 
a result of negative economic consequences on both countries. In this case South Africa is 
likely to be affected negatively by the possible renegotiation of trade agreements between the 
UK and her EU counterparts (Rensburg, 2016). 
5.5. Implication of Britain’s exit from the EU on South Africa 
5.5.1. Positive Outcomes 
There are numerous implications of the British exit of the EU. On a positive note the British 
exit from the EU should act as an eye opener on why South Africa should not seek trade 
agreement with the EU but should focus more on regional integration. Particularly improving 
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trade within the SADC region where it already claims dominance and is likely to benefit more. 
South Africa has much to gain from Brexit. According to (Botha, 2016) South Africa will 
benefit from the increase in the gold price. The increased uncertainty in financial markets has 
made safe haven assets such as gold to stay in demand well into the future. Economic research 
agencies such as the International Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB) (2015), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2013) among others have predicted the continuation of 
the extraordinary low interest rate environment in Europe, the United States of America and 
other advanced economies such as China (IMF, 2013; ICMB, 2015). In this case South Africa 
is likely to benefit from increased employment in different sectors including mining. However, 
this will be accompanied by increased labour migration into the country and the enhancement 
of core-periphery relations between South Africa and its neighbours. 
With British exit from the EU, South Africa stands a good chance of benefitting from future 
bilateral trade and investment agreements with Britain. SA has enjoyed strong economic 
cooperation with Britain. This status could serve as a gateway for business and development 
for sub-Saharan Africa. Botha (2016) points out that within the continent of Africa, SA has the 
most competitive economy as well as superior infrastructural and financial market as compared 
to other emerging markets. The move by Britain out of the EU could also mean that South 
Africa can trade with Britain outside the confinement of a global trade agreement. According 
to Botha (2016) the British can set up shop in South Africa. The UK has several options after 
exiting the EU. Britain could opt to join the existing non-EU European States Free Trade Area 
(EFTA). This will guarantee the UK an access to the market from the EU. South Africa also 
stands the chance of benefiting from this arrangement since the customs union already has an 
agreement with EFTA. In addition, it is possible for Britain to decide to pursue bilateral trade 
deals on its own. However, the challenge is that it has not done for decades. 
5.5.2. Negative Consequences 
Although a number of positive outcomes can be anticipated from the exit of Britain in the EU 
for South Africa and its neighbours, other negative outcomes are likely to arise as well. There 
are about three ways in which South Africa can be affected by the exit under discussion. These 
include its markets, trade and currency. Analysts have argued severally that the British vote to 
exit from the European Union has shaken world markets and exposed South Africa to a 
likelihood of a deeper economic catastrophe (Lee, 2016; Monks, 2016: Smith, 2016; Rensburg, 
2016; Tan, 2016; The Telegraph, 2016). Over the past years South Africa’s economy has been 
struggling and is facing a further decline as a result of Britain’s decision to exit the EU. There 
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are threats of a recession if SA is to continue moving towards a negative economic growth 
(Matthews, 2015). The two consecutive quarters of negative growth that are likely to occur 
would harmfully affect jobs in South Africa. In addition, the plans by the reserve bank to put 
inflation above economic growth are likely to be affected. However, it has been noted that 
South Africa’s economy has grown by 3,3% quarter-on-quarter according to estimates of real 
gross domestic product as measured by production (Algu and Creamer, 2015; Creamer, n.d; 
SARB, 2015; Statt SA, 2016; NWDC, 2016). This is the fastest quarter-on-quarter rise in 
economic activity since the fourth quarter of 2014. Year-on-year growth in the second quarter 
of 2016 was 0,6% suggesting a positive growth in the GDP with the mining and manufacturing 
industries contributing over half of the growth in GDP. This suggests that such speculations of 
a recession might be overstated. However, the 2016 growth did tumble and thus its possible 
implications cannot be undermined (Rensburg, 2016; Tan, 2016). 
The most likely impact of British exit is damage on the markets (Matthews, 2015). According 
to  (Łazowski, 2012) whenever there is a global shock such as the move by Britain, investors 
are forced to move to the US bond been the safest asset. As a result of the flow of money into 
the US bond market from other areas, the emerging markets around the globe were shaken by 
the capital flight. South Africa in question was vulnerable to the outflow of such capital as it 
has a big current account deficit. This means that SA needs money to continue flowing into its 
own financial markets to keep the rand steady and if the opposite happens the rand is going to 
grow weaker (Monks, 2016: Smith, 2016; Rensburg, 2016; Tan, 2016). According to (Murray 
and Broomfield (2014) if capital flight continues, the economies that have large external 
funding requirement such as South Africa and Turkey could be pressured to raise interest rates. 
In addition, South Africa also falls among those emerging markets with banking systems that 
have a relatively high dependence on short-term funding in the capital markets. Thus it is 
particularly exposed to market trouble (Murray and Broomfield, 2014). 
One of the negative impacts of the British exit is a decline of the Rand. The British exit from 
the EU has far reaching effects which are of critical importance not only to the UK and Europe, 
but also in Southern Africa. For instance, South Africa already faces currency issues with the 
rand losing power; the exit is likely to increase the Rand’s volatility (Lee, 2016; Monks, 2016: 
Smith, 2016; Rensburg, 2016; Tan, 2016 
Botha (2016) argues that South Africa’s emerging market economy is under strain. The British 
exit has added global uncertainty and a potential capital flight to safer areas such as the United 
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States of America which is not in the EU. Thus Brexit is likely to complicate life in SA and 
could hurt the countries already ailing GDP growth. The “Brexit” has resulted in the decline of 
the equity market. According to (Lis and Wilding, 2016) although the global investments funds 
have not dried up, investments have been directed to other areas that are considered safe. For 
instance, there is a new focus of investment to what are being termed safe havens which include 
precious metals and US bonds. 
The British exit from the EU is also going to slow SA’s economic growth. According to 
(Matthews, 2015) a sluggish global rate of growth will eventually hit demand for local exports, 
growth and jobs. Supporting this perspective, Murray and Broomfield (2014) argue that Slower 
growth is likely to undermine South Africa’s credit rating, which is currently at the bottom of 
the investment-grade scale. Another direct effect on South Africa’s economy has resulted from 
the decline the British pound which fell 4% against the rand, 8% against the US dollar and 6% 
against the euro (Murray and Broomfield, 2014). This is likely to cause serious damage its 
immediate economic prospects. In theory, this means Britain has to pay more for anything they 
import which will increase the competitiveness of their exports. 
In line with the foregoing discussion, the greatest challenge South Africa is likely to face as a 
result of British exit is market volatility because of the uncertainty which is threatening a 
continued low-growth environment for the country (Matthews, 2015). The capital constrains 
triggered by the British exit has the potential to affect South Africa’s ability to access financing 
from British banks. According to (Matthews, 2015) UK lenders’ claims on the entities in South 
Africa amount to over 170% of South Africa’s foreign currency reserves. The main challenges 
remain unknown as it is not clear if Britain will renegotiate separate agreements with countries 
to maintain some of the existing arrangements. 
The EU provides the provisions for freedom of movement and as such being part of EU means 
that member states’ workers can work in those other countries for free and they are protected 
by EU laws in terms of working hours and wages. In this case, due to the TDCA agreement 
that also allows for the flow of human capital, South Africans could have enjoyed employment 
in Britain and the exit of Britain is likely to affect such migration policies. It can be observed 
that the opposition to be part of the EU was the concern with immigration. Some analysts 
viewed immigration as bad for the economy and thus want to leave the EU (Cook, 2016; 
Dewan, 2016; Lee, 2016; Somerville, 2016; OECD, 2014; Worstall, 2016). They were of the 
opinion that immigration largely undermines than it enriches Britain’s cultural life. In the 
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context of South Africa, the British exit from the EU is likely to affect immigration patterns 
between SA and Britain (Cook, 2016; Dewan, 2016; Lee, 2016; Somerville, 2016; OECD, 
2014; Worstall, 2016) 
Although there is no visible immediate impact, the partnership consensus reached between SA 
customs union, Mozambique and the EU is bond to substitute the TDCA between South Africa 
and EU. The United Kingdom exist of the EU will serve as a major constrain to the deal as it 
was a major player to the partnership agreement. An important part of the agreement entails 
aces to Britain’s market. Hence, the exist of Britain from the EU will pose a major problem for 
EU not only in its trade agreement with SADC, but with other regional blocs. 
The British exit will upset the global economy especially trade and investment. According to 
(Murray & Broomfield, 2014)  trade arrangements  between most countries in Africa and 
Britain were largely negotiated through the European Union. This in effect means that when 
Britain exits the EU all the trade relations and agreements will become null and void. This will 
be disastrous for Africa particularly SA as the UK will no longer be a stakeholder of the key 
initiatives which forms the basis of co-operation between Europe and the continent. The Brexit 
will impact negatively on the important regional blocs in Africa since as it provides the 
strongest supports for the development of economic growth and democracy. Colossal pressure 
will also increase on the emerging markets and frontier asset markets because of the financial 
instability. 
Analysts predict that the effects of British exit out of the EU in South Africa are expected to 
be disastrous (Lee, 2016; Monks, 2016: Smith, 2016; Rensburg, 2016; Tan, 2016; The 
Telegraph, 2016). South Africa is said to have an already bad economy may be further affected 
by the exit as the UK is Africa’s largest trading partner. According to the 2015 data, Britain’s 
market accounts for South Africa’s 8th largest import and export in global terms. Its trade, 
investment as well as developmental aid will suffer a major setback if the British exit of the 
EU leads to a voids all trade agreements deals that have been made. These agreements include 
among others, the EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement. Hence, Britain leaving the EU 
might result in the likelihood of higher inflation rate, higher interest rates, capital outflows, 
extended weaker growth, and a possible decline in GDP. Given that in the day of the news of 
Britain’s decision to exit the EU, the rand fell more than 7%. This was the steepest single day 




The vote to exit the EU in Britain has implications for the SA’s trade and business interests. 
The research compiled by the South African Institute of International Affairs has identified the 
European Union as South Africa’s most important strategic partners in trade. The EU has 
entered into a series of trade treaties and economic partnership agreements with South Africa 
over the years. The more favourable trade balance between SA and the EU has been with 
Britain. For instance South Africa has benefited from foreign direct investment from the UK 
which in 2014 totalled an estimate of over R730 billion in 2014 (Murray & Broomfield, 2014). 
In 2015 Britain was South Africa’s eighth largest trade partner and in that period the country’s 
exports to Britain were over R41 billion. On the other hand, the British imports to South Africa 
were over R35 billion. Given the above, it is highly likely that the British exit is going to have 
an impact on the existing arrangements. 
Although there is an anticipated economic impact to be expected by the British exit of the EU, 
such a move should not be exaggerated (Lis & Wilding, 2016). Botha 2016 notes that although 
Britain may be out of the EU, it will remain an integral and pivotal part of Europe. Thus the 
impact is less likely to be catastrophic. Britain remains a strong economic giant and very 
influential in the world. Lis and Wilding (2016) note that Britain has been classified by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a major advanced economy. The UK is also a member 
of the seven most influential countries in the world (the G-7 group). The country under study 
has a per capita GDP of $44,000. This is four times greater than the world average. In this case 
Britain’s position in the world economy will remain intact and thus its move may not 
necessarily result in a rapid decline of its socio-economic status. In addition, despite 
withdrawing their membership, British business have to comply with alternatives legislations, 
particularly if trading within the EU. 
Although the exit of Britain from the EU will be a loss of an economic giant, other economic 
powers have continued to be in the EU. There are other member states of the EU who have 
good economies that can remain as good trade partners with South Africa. These countries 
include Spain, Sweden, France, and Italy just to mention a few. Thus the move by Britain 
although it is going to shake the world economy its impact might be limited and short-lived. 
In-line with the above analysis, although uncertainty is brewed by the British vote to exit the 
EU, the exit has not been finalised. Botha (2016) argues that the onerous legal and 
administrative processes required for such exit will take several years before it is completed. 
This gives time to the EU member states to prepare for the eventual exit of Britain. Botha 
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(2016) also adds that there are a number of trade treaties which need to be nullified but most 
of them can be renegotiated. 
The exit of Britain from the EU should be a lesson for South Africa not to join the treaty as it 
can foster trade agreements with European countries without having to be a member state. For 
instance, Norway is an economic giant but is not a member of the EU. Norway has enjoyed 
similar access to benefits similar to that of the member countries as it agreed to abide by the 
rules of the internal market. This among others include environmental and social legislations, 
as well as paying smaller contributions to the EU which is lesser than that of EU member states. 
The above suggests that Norway is a clear case study of a non EU member country which have 
access to the economic privilege enjoyed by EU states. In the extreme of outcomes, the trade 
agreement is likely to become void. This is because the exit by Britain increases the fear of 
further exits by its members. 
The impact of Britain exiting the EU is a clear reflection of SA’s dependence on EU as well as 
Britain for trade and investment. The world systems theory already gives us a perspective of 
SA dependency role and how Britain leaving the EU could affect their market, trade as well as 
their currency. This does not only affect SA but would also affect other African countries that 
trade with the EU. The negative impacts could also be an indicator to SA of the importance of 
strengthening regional integration within SADC. Both the EU and Britain still need raw 
materials that are in SADC countries, so if SADC was more unified, they would not be greatly 
affected by the conflicts happening in Europe. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In summary this chapter discussed the impact of the exit of Britain from the European Union. 
The chapter summarily argued that the clamour for Britain’s exist from the EU is hinged on 
the need to advance its strategic national interest by exploring its strategic advantage within 
the commonwealth and global arena as a whole. Due to the policy drive and structure of the 
EU, it was thus not in Britain’s national economic interest to remain in the EU. In line with the 
foregoing, due to uncertainty created, the main challenges of this move remain unknown as it 
is not clear if Britain will renegotiate separate agreements with countries to maintain some of 
the existing arrangements. However, it is clear that the negotiation of separate arrangement will 
be based on Britain’s need to protect her national interest in line with the arrangements to be 
reached.   The chapter further discussed the role of Britain in the EU, as well as the history of 
trade relations between South Africa and Britain. The chapter argued that the exit of Britain 
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from the EU could have both negative and positive impact on South Africa’s economy. 
However, the greatest challenge South Africa is likely to face as a result of British exit of the 
EU is market volatility which is likely to lead to a slow economic growth for South Africa. The 
exit would likely lead to South Africa possibly signing an independent trade agreement with 
Britain outside the confinements of the EU. SA was likely to benefit from the developed 
economy of the British. The move would also likely result in the focus of ‘safe havens’ such 








This chapter is the concluding chapter of the study. It will provide a summary overview of the 
study. It was argued that during apartheid South Africa was excluded from trade with many 
countries especially those in the European Union (EU). However, post-apartheid saw a big 
transition in both social and economic development that resulted from the global economic 
integration of South Africa. The chapter will also summarize the impact of the EU-SA trade on 
the trade welfare of the country as well as its impact on the SADC region. As well as the impact 
of Britain’s exit from the EU and how it could potentially affect South Africa and other African 
countries. It has been argued that national interest as argued by the realist scholars as well as 
core periphery relationships that characterize the global economy still exist. The EU-SA trade 
agreement is a perfect depletion of an agreement that characterizes such a relationship. 
6.2. Summary of the Study 
Although there is enormous literature on the trade agreement between South Africa and the 
EU, as well as how it has improved SA’s international trade, little attention has been made to 
point out how this trade agreement affects SA’s economy and whether or not it has a positive 
or negative impact on SA economy and people. This research also looked at the impact this 
agreement has on SADC. Particularly whether the EU-SA trade agreements promote or retard 
integration within SADC region. This study thus engaged with the critical analysis of the trade 
agreement between SA and EU and the implications it has on SADC. Based on the findings of 
this analysis, the following conclusions can be made; the Trade and Development Cooperation 
Agreement entered into between SA and European Union is vast and wide-ranging and has had 
an impact on the South African economy. 
There have been a number of trade agreements signed between South Africa and the other 
countries. The post-apartheid period has seen SA signed several trade agreements which were 
designed to improve the countries social and economic development. These have varied from 
local, regional as well as global trade. Regionally, the dominant agreements have been those 
made with SACU and SADC.South Africa is a member of Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). The regional economic agenda in SADC is to facilitate policies which 
will lead to the integration of the market as well as the coordination of policy which will lead 
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to sectoral cooperation in a broad developmental project. Its Protocol on Trade amended in 
August of 2008 had a vision to establish a Free Trade Agreement within the SADC region. 
This would be achieved by further loosening restrictions on the trades in goods and services 
within the region so as to ensure for efficient production and the improvement of the 
environment for domestic commodities. It also sought to promote investment which are either 
cross border or foreign in nature as well as enhancing the development of the economy through 
industrialization and economic diversification of the region. South Africa has enjoyed a number 
of benefits from trade with countries in the SADC region. This form of regional integration has 
had considerable economic benefits to the country by expanding and growing the export 
market. This has also resulted in the country becoming more competitive in the global 
economic environment and also achieving economies of scale. 
6.3. Impact of EU-SA Trade on Trade Welfare 
Trade relation between SA and EU have experience a substantial improvement since the 
signing of the TDCA agreement in 2000. The trade in goods commodities have substantially 
increased by more than 120%. In addition, the trade agreement has also resulted in more than 
fivefold growth of Foreign Direct Investment. This indicate that EU-South Africa trade, though 
imbalanced in terms of the core-semi periphery-periphery relationship, has in many ways serve 
the national interest of the parties involved.  
This study has observed similar finding to that of Lewis et al (2000) who argue that free trade 
arrangement between SA and EU has a potential benefit for the parties involved especially for 
SA because it would increase its export to EU on goods commodities such as vegetable and 
fruits which in the past were constrained by had high tariff. This study has indicated that there 
has been an increase in South Africa’s exports of processed food as well as grain which has 
been beneficial for both parties. The trade agreement has also resulted in equal platform for 
competition amongst EU and SA companies as well as providing urgent consultations. South 
Africa major imports from the EU are in industrial goods, such as iron and steel, machinery 
items, and chemical products. They in turn export commodities such as minerals, wine, metals, 
vegetables and other agricultural products. In addition, the EU has also enjoyed among others, 
the advantages of having for the import of natural resources, textile, agricultural products, wine 
and labour force. 
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6.4. Impact of EU-South African Trade on SADC 
South Africa has firmly established itself as the epicentre of economic and trade flow in 
Southern Africa. Since the 1950’s, a vital part of South Africa’s development strategy as well 
as that of most countries in Africa is the regional integration approach. The trade relations 
between SA and the EU have resulted in mixed outcomes both promoting regional trade as well 
as causing some notable challenges to the trade relations within the region. TDCA deal between 
South Africa and the EU is likely to have a significant bearing on the Southern African region 
and SADC in particular. The TDCA vision makes it possible for SACU member states to link 
their production mechanisms in agriculture, industry, manufacturing and services. It can be 
concluded that the trade agreement has at some level strengthened as well as promoted regional 
integration within SADC. 
It can be argued that South Africa has entered the world economy at the expense of SADC. 
Lewis, Robinson and Thierfelder (2003) shared similar views when they argue that SADC 
countries will suffer from the EU-SA trade agreement. For them, a free trade agreement 
between SADC regions is more effective than a free trade agreement only between the SADC 
countries with the EU. The TDCA has had a negative impact on the progress of regional 
economic integration in the SADC region in terms of economic and trade development. 
Britain’s recent decision to exit from the EU has caused global uncertainty. Britain joined the 
EU in 1973 and has very strong economy with lucrative trade engagements. The main causes 
of Britain deciding to exit the EU were that Britain wants to focus more on the Commonwealth. 
The British government has expressed interest to take up a stronger role in order to develop 
political, economic and cultural integration. Instead of the EU promoting regional integration 
it has mainly engaged in protectionism resulting in having inefficient producers at the expense 
of efficient ones. Britain also began to question the instrumental benefits of the EU because it 
had seemed to lose popularity, as well as questioning leadership within EU which was viewed 
as power without accountability. 
There is no doubt that Brexit has cause a lot of uncertainty for South Africa in terms of future 
trade engagements as well as trying to assess just how much of an impact this will have on their 
markets, trade and their currency. Britain is SA’s eighth largest import and export market 
globally. There are some positive impacts of Britain leaving the EU, SA could benefit from 
increased gold prices. It could give room for SA to then focus more on regional integration 
because Britain’s decision leaves South Africa exposed to many uncertainties. It could lower 
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inflation prices as we have already seen that the Rand has been steady ever since Britain 
announced its decision to leave the EU. SA could benefit from possible future bilateral trade 
and investment agreements with Britain. However, there is no ruling out the possible negative 
impacts. Brexit could cause both market volatility and a capital flight of investors moving into 
the US bond market. This could cause a huge current account deficit. It could result in slow 
economic growth in South Africa. There could be high interest rates creating capital outflows 
and a possible decline in GDP. It could lead to a recession which could affect jobs in South 
Africa. Immigration policies can be tightened since there will be no need for Britain to be 
flexible with immigration policies. It could also affect trade and investment because the only 
trade arrangements that exist between African countries and the UK were negotiated through 
the EU. 
6.5. Conclusions/Implications of the Study 
In conclusion, the trade relations that exist between the European Union and South Africa have 
brought the country in question into the world trade where it had been previously excluded. 
South Africa has enjoyed the benefits of such trade which include the export of its goods with 
reduced tariffs. However, its involvement in such a trade has resulted in adverse consequences 
on its regional trade. 
There had been extensive tariff removal and reduction since 1994. It is important to note that 
while there has been a significant increase in South Africa’s Export, the majority of export 
commodities, with some notable exceptions, still remain largely unchanged.  Except in African 
markets, SA’s exports is still largely dominated by primary commodities.  South Africa is the 
dominant player in SADC and if existing resources are used in regional integration can prove 
to be beneficial. In addition, the country should support industrial development and upgrading, 
employment growth and increased value-added exports.  South Africa previously had a 
relatively open economy that was protected only moderately by tariffs, where 56% of duties 
were set at 0%. There is therefore a need for more improved tariffs that are uniform for both 
the EU and other foreign countries as well as within the SADC region. 
This study explored the nature of the EU-SA trade agreement commonly known as TDCA. The 
deal agreement was targeted towards a cooperative broad array of economic and social sectors 
that are vital to their two economies. It was identified that although South Africa has benefited 
from the trade agreement with the EU, the EU has largely benefited more at the expense of 
South Africa. South Africa is among the developing countries in the world and its trade 
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relations with developed countries is characterised by dependency.  If viewed from a world 
systems theory perspective, the existing trade relations between SA and the EU have resulted 
in unequal exchange. Wallerstein (1974) understands this phenomenon as the “systematic 
transfer of surplus from semi proletarian sectors in the periphery to the high technology, 
industrialised core”. The engagements with EU have resulted in the lowering of export prices. 
This is because of unequal rates of exchange between the EU and SA in which in most cases 
the EU pay lower rates for raw materials. It can be concluded that South Africa is among the 
African states that have been integrated unequally into the world economy on disadvantaged 
terms which affects their development. 
In conclusion, this study provided a background of the SA-EU trade. It indicated that South 
Africa has enjoyed a number of trade agreements after the abolition of apartheid. These trade 
agreements were made regionally and internationally. Regionally, South Africa has 
commanded dominance within the region being the leader of the SADC trade. It has been able 
to enjoy good prices on both exports and imports. The regional trade has improved the local 
manufacturing companies and have thus increased employment opportunities. South Africa has 
also been identified as a player in the global economy 
6.6. Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
There is a need to promote regional integration. It’s the formula for the country because it has 
better exchange rate as compared to that of global trade. They can focus on more exports and 
imports of finished goods rather than primary goods that they currently export to the European 
Union. Such an approach would encourage development of and upgrade of value-added, 
labour-absorbing industrial production. 
There have been questions raised by the South African Reserve Bank (2015), Statistics South 
Africa (2016), Dewan, (2016) among others on South Africa’s “open economy”, the benefits 
of tariff protection and the benefits of Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs).   Some trade 
agreements as noted above have raised concern to economists who have observed that South 
Africa is not sufficiently protecting her economy as she continuously open up her market at an 
alarming pace. It is general truth that historically, developed economy will always want to 
penetrate other markets while ensuring they keep a guard on their own markets. There is 
therefore, a need for South Africa as well as other countries in Africa to consciously move from 
the export of primary commodities into the export of more finished goods. Several available 
trade agreements give a limelight as to how countries can diversify their economy and move 
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from primary export oriented to manufacturing oriented. Bearing this in mind, there is a 
possibility that the regional integration policies could result in trade policies which could 
contribute to the growth in employment and industrial development for South Africa and other 
developing economy. 
There is need for specialization of goods as well as strengthening Import Substitution policies 
so as to improve its performance in the regional market. This view is based on David Ricardo`s 
model of comparative advantage which suggests that a country engaging in international trade 
should specialize in the production of those goods that it produces most efficiently and to buy 
the goods that it produces less efficiently from other countries, even if this means buying goods 
from other countries that it could produce more efficiently itself. This view of comparative 
advantage allows a country like South Africa to able to share the welfare benefits of free trade 
even though it produces everything less efficiently than any of its trading partners. 
Strengthening manufacturing industries would result in the processing of primary commodities 
which promoted the export of finished goods and locally increases employment in the 
industries. 
In addition, there is therefore a need for more improved tariffs that are uniform for both the EU 
and other foreign countries as well as within the SADC region. Need for a common Tariff on 
all goods imported into from both the EU and SADC. Given South Africa’s position as a major 
role player within the pool of developing countries’ economies, there is strong need for South 
Africa to develop initiatives so as to assist other developing countries.  The responsibility on 
the shoulder of South Africa as a major world player among the developing economies can be 
discussed in terms of the negotiations around the agreements entered, neighbouring countries 
partnerships and the view developed countries have of South Africa.  The challenge that has 
been identified is that South Africa is considered more developed than the average African 
country by developed countries which has resulted in them being reluctant to afford the country 
the same allowances as its African counterparts. 
6.7. Recommendations for Further Research 
There is a need to access the benefits of regional integration, using channels like SADC. Market 
integration theory provides a guideline for successful regional integration. There is also a need 
to understand that through the world systems theory and realist theory paradigm, if developing 
countries trade individually they will never fully benefit and gain comparative advantage. 
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hence, there is a need to conduct further research by collecting new qualitative and quantitative 
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